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Introduction 
	
Major	part	of	the	research	on	international	migration	has	been	on	migration	from	poor	or	
developing	 countries	 to	 rich	 countries,	 and	 public	 discussion	 on	migration	 in	many	 rich	
countries	is	centered	around	issues	related	to	immigration.		Less	attention	has	been	paid	to	
the	 fact	 that	migration	 from	 rich	 countries	 takes	 place	 as	 well.	 According	 to	 the	 United	
Nations	 (2013),	 21.9	million	persons	 from	EU15	 countries	 lived	outside	 their	 birthplace,	
with	 42	 percent	 of	 these	 migrants	 living	 in	 other	 EU15	 countries	 and	 an	 additional	 13	
percent	living	in	the	United	States.		The	essays	in	this	dissertation	aim	to	shed	light	on	some	
central	 questions	 concerning	migration	 in	 and	 from	European	 countries.	 Since	 economic	
returns	to	individual	skills	are	relatively	low	in	many	European	welfare	states,	it	is	of	policy	
relevance	 to	 study	 whether	 differences	 in	 skill	 prices	 or	 taxation	 are	 reasons	 behind	
migration	from	these	countries.	
	
Perhaps	the	most	fundamental	question	in	economics	of	migration	concerns	self‐selection	
of	migrants.		The	notion	that		migrants	are	not	randomly	selected	from	the	populations	of	
the	 sending	 countries	 is	 a	 central	 result	 in	 economics	 of	 migration,	 and	 beginning	 with	
Borjas	 (1987),	 there	has	been	a	great	deal	 of	 interest	 in	deriving	and	empirically	 testing	
models	that	predict	how	migrants	differ	from	non‐migrants.	The	question	is	of	relevance,	
since	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 non‐random	 selection	 of	 migrants	 affects	 the	 level	 and	 the	
distribution	 of	 welfare	 in	 both	 sending	 and	 receiving	 countries.	 However,	 most	 of	 the	
contemporary	 empirical	 evidence	 on	 self‐selection	 of	 migrants	 concerns	migration	 from	
Mexico	 to	 the	United	 States,	 and	 there	 is	 not	much	 empirical	 evidence	 on	what	 kinds	 of	
people	actually	migrate	from	Western‐European	countries.	Chapter	1	of	this	thesis	aims	to	
address	this	deficit	by	studying	self‐selection	of	long‐term	migrants	from	Denmark,	a	rich	
and	a	highly	redistributive	European	welfare	state.	In	addition	to	addressing	the	need	for	
empirical	 knowledge	 of	 selection	 of	migrants	 from	 a	 rich	 European	 country	 the	 chapter	
also	introduces	a	novel	theoretical	contribution	as	it	is	shown	that	the	Roy	model	has	more	
precise	predictions	about	the	self‐selection	of	migrants	than	has	been	previously	realized.	
The	 same	 conditions	 that	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 result	 in	 positive	 or	 negative	 selection	 in	
terms	 of	 expected	 earnings	 also	 imply	 a	 stochastic	 dominance	 relationship	 between	 the	
earnings	or	skill	distributions	of	migrants	and	non‐migrants.	Using	Danish	full‐population	
register	data	we	are	able	 find	strong	support	 for	 the	theoretical	considerations;	migrants	
from	 Denmark	 are	 positively	 selected	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 age‐year	 standardized	 pre‐
emigration	earnings	and	in	terms	of	wage	regression	residuals	that	serve	as	a	measure	of	
unobserved	 earnings	 ability.	 Further,	 we	 also	 find	 strong	 support	 for	 the	 stochastic	
dominance	prediction.	
	
The	second	chapter	of	the	thesis	uses	unique	survey	data	on	Danish	long‐term	migrants	to	
study	 what	 determines	 their	 preferences	 for	 redistribution	 of	 income	 in	 Denmark.	 The	
question	is	relevant	because,	as	the	results	in	chapter	one	reveal,	migrants	from	Denmark	
are	 positively	 self‐selected	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 earnings	 ability.	 As	 the	 income	 taxes	 in	
Denmark	are	high	in	international	comparison,	it	would	be	also	of	policy	interest	to	know	
whether	Danish	emigrants	left	the	country	because	of	taxation.	One	of	the	main	findings	of	
 
 
the	chapter	 is	 that	migrants	who	 live	 in	destinations	outside	Nordic	countries,	where	the	
societies	 are	 relatively	 similar	 to	Denmark	 in	 terms	of	 taxation	and	 returns	 to	 skills,	 are	
more	opposed	to	a	suggestion	of	increasing	redistribution	of	income	in	Denmark.		Further,	
those	who	migrated	for	work‐related	reasons	are	more	opposed	to	the	suggestion.	We	are	
not	 able	 to	 show	 whether	 those	 who	 dislike	 high	 taxes	 in	 Denmark	 self‐select	 to	 non‐
Nordic	 destinations,	 or	 whether	 migrants	 to	 these	 destinations	 have	 assimilated	 to	 the	
values	prevailing	in	the	host	country.		
	
The	third	chapter	of	the	dissertation	studies	whether	trust	towards	institutions	is	a	cultural	
trait	 that	migrants	bring	with	 them	from	their	countries	of	origin,	or	whether	 it	 tends	 to	
change	rapidly.	The	main	 finding	 is	 that	unlike	more	general	 trust	 towards	other	people,	
trust	towards	institutions	seems	to	change	when	an	individual	migrates	from	one	country	
to	 the	other.	Trust	 towards	 institutions	 is	widely	considered	to	be	an	essential	 feature	of	
European	welfare	states.	According	to	the	findings	it	is	possible	for	a	culture	where	public	
institutions	 are	 highly	 trusted	 to	 persist	 also	 with	 increasing	 flows	 of	 international	
migration.			
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Chapter 1.  
Self-Selection of Emigrants: Theory and Evidence on Stochastic Dominance in 
Observable and Unobservable Characteristics 
	
This	chapter	is	based	on	joint	work	with	George	Borjas	and	Panu	Poutvaara	
	
	
1.1	Introduction	
	
A	central	finding	in	the	economic	literature	on	international	migration	is	that	emigrants	are	
not	randomly	selected	from	the	population	of	the	source	countries.	The	nature	of	the	non‐
random	 selection	 affects	 the	 level	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	 welfare	 through	 two	 major	
channels.	First,	the	skill	distribution	of	migrants	affects	the	wage	structure	in	both	sending	
and	receiving	countries	(Borjas	2003).	A	second	effect	takes	place	through	the	public	sector.	
Immigration	creates	a	fiscal	surplus	in	the	receiving	country	if	and	only	if	the	net	present	
value	of	 the	 tax	payments	of	 immigrants	 exceeds	 the	net	present	 value	of	 the	 costs	 they	
impose.	 Both	 the	 immigration	 of	 net	 recipients	 and	 the	 emigration	 of	 net	 payers	 pose	 a	
challenge	to	the	public	treasury	(Wildasin	1991;	Sinn	1997).		
	
Beginning	 with	 Borjas	 (1987),	 there	 has	 been	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 interest	 in	 deriving	 and	
empirically	 testing	models	 that	 predict	 how	migrants	 differ	 from	non‐migrants.	Many	 of	
these	studies	rely	on	an	application	of	the	Roy	model	of	occupational	self‐selection.	As	long	
as	 skills	 are	 sufficiently	 transferable	 across	 countries,	 the	 sorting	 of	 persons	 across	
countries	is	mainly	determined	by	international	differences	in	the	rate	of	return	to	skills.	A	
country	 like	 the	 United	 States	 would	 then	 attract	 high‐skilled	 workers	 from	 more	
egalitarian	countries	(i.e.,	countries	offering	relatively	low	rates	of	return	to	skills)	and	low‐
skilled	workers	 from	 countries	with	 greater	 income	 inequality	 than	 in	 the	United	 States	
(i.e.,	 countries	 offering	 higher	 rates	 of	 return	 to	 skills).	 The	 evidence	 indeed	 suggests	 a	
negative	cross‐section	correlation	between	the	earnings	of	immigrants	in	the	United	States	
and	the	extent	of	income	inequality	in	the	source	countries.1	
	
Although	the	existing	literature	on	immigrant	selection	focuses	either	on	the	U.S.	context	or	
on	 migration	 flows	 from	 poor	 to	 rich	 countries,	 there	 are	 also	 sizable	 migration	 flows	
between	rich	countries.2	According	to	the	United	Nations	(2013),	21.9	million	persons	from	
																																																								
1	Related	cross‐country	studies	include	Cobb‐Clark	(1993)	and	Bratsberg	(1995).	
2	Studies	of	the	selection	of	migrants	across	developed	countries	include	Lundborg	(1991),	Pirttilä	
(2004),	Kleven	et	al.	(2014),	and	Junge	et	al.	(2014).	Many	studies	also	examine	selection	issues	in	a	historical	
context;	see	Wegge	(1999,	2002),	Abramitzky	and	Braggion	(2006),	Abramitzky,	Boustan,	and	Eriksson	
(2012),	Ferrie	(1996),	and	Margo	(1990).	
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EU15	countries	now	live	outside	their	birthplace,	with	42	percent	of	these	migrants	living	
in	other	EU15	countries	and	an	additional	13	percent	living	in	the	United	States.3		
	
This	paper	examines	the	self‐selection	of	emigrants	from	Denmark,	one	of	the	richest	and	
most	 redistributive	European	welfare	 states.	 In	2013,	over	 a	quarter	million	Danes	 lived	
outside	Denmark	(corresponding	to	about	5	percent	of	the	Danish‐born	population),	with	
50	 percent	 of	 the	migrants	 living	 in	 other	 EU15	 countries	 and	 13	 percent	 in	 the	 United	
States	 (United	 Nations,	 Department	 of	 Economic	 and	 Social	 Affairs	 2013).	 Because	 the	
returns	to	skills	 in	Denmark	are	relatively	low,	the	canonical	Roy	model	predicts	that	the	
emigrants	 should	 be	 positively	 selected	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 expected	 earnings	 of	 the	
migrants	exceed	the	expected	earnings	of	the	stayers.4	However,	there	have	not	been	any	
prior	 studies	 that	 examine	 the	 self‐selection	 of	 migrants	 from	 a	 relatively	 egalitarian	
country	to	see	whether	this	is	indeed	the	case.	
	
Our	 theoretical	 analysis	 distinguishes	 between	 selection	 in	 observable	 and	 selection	 in	
unobservable	characteristics.	In	addition,	we	show	that	the	canonical	framework	does	not	
only	have	predictions	about	the	difference	between	the	expected	earnings	of	migrants	and	
non‐migrants,	which	is	the	basis	for	the	standard	definition	of	positive	or	negative	selection	
in	 the	 literature,	but	also	about	 the	stochastic	ordering	of	 the	 two	earnings	distributions.	
We	show	that	the	same	conditions	that	predict	that	migrants	are	positively	self‐selected	in	
the	sense	of	a	difference	 in	expected	incomes	also	predict	that	the	 income	distribution	of	
the	migrants	will	 first‐order	 stochastically	 dominate	 the	 income	 distribution	 of	 the	 non‐
migrants.	
	
Our	 empirical	 analysis	 uses	 the	 Danish	 full	 population	 register	 data	 to	 analyze	 how	
migrants	 and	 non‐migrants	 differ	 in	 their	 pre‐emigration	 earnings	 and	 other	 observable	
characteristics.	 To	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 role	 of	 unobservable	 characteristics	 in	 the	 selection	
process,	we	 investigate	 how	migrants	 and	 non‐migrants	 differ	 in	 terms	 of	 unobservable	
earnings	ability,	measured	by	residuals	from	Mincerian	earnings	regressions.	Our	empirical	
results	are	in	line	with	the	predictions	of	the	model:	Danish	emigrants	are	indeed	positively	
self‐selected	both	in	terms	of	earnings	and	in	terms	of	residuals	from	the	wage	regressions.	
Following	 our	 reframing	 of	 the	 canonical	 Roy	 framework	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 concept	 of	
stochastic	dominance,	our	study	specifically	tests	for	whether	the	earnings	distribution	of	
the	emigrants	 stochastically	dominates	 that	of	 the	 stayers	 (as	would	be	predicted	by	 the	
model).	The	evidence	confirms	this	strong	theoretical	prediction	over	most	of	the	support	
of	the	earnings	distribution.		
																																																								
3	The	EU15	countries	refer	to	the	member	states	of	the	European	Union	prior	to	the	expansion	in	
May	1,	2004.	
4	For	comparisons	of	gross	wage	premia	from	tertiary	education	across	countries	see	Boarini	and	
Straus	(2010).	A	recent	paper	studying	returns	to	cognitive	skills	is	Hanushek	et	al.	(2015).	The	study	finds	
significant	cross‐country	differences.	Moreover,	the	returns	are	relatively	low	in	Denmark	as	well	as	in	other	
Nordic	countries,	and	high	in	the	United	States,	Germany	and	the	United	Kingdom,	which	also	are	among	the	
most	popular	destinations	of	Danish	migrants.			
	
5 
 
	
Our	analysis	is	related	to	the	flurry	of	recent	papers	that	examine	the	selection	of	migrants	
from	Mexico	to	the	United	States.	The	pioneering	analysis	of	Chiquiar	and	Hanson	(2005)	
merged	 information	 from	 the	U.S.	 census	 on	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	Mexican	migrants	
with	 information	 from	 the	 Mexican	 census	 on	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Mexican	 non‐
migrants.	 Because	 the	merged	 data	 did	 not	 report	 the	 earnings	 of	migrants	prior	 to	 the	
move,	 pre‐migration	 earnings	were	 predicted	 based	 on	 observable	 characteristics	 of	 the	
migrants.	This	“counterfactual”	empirical	exercise	suggested	that	Mexican	emigrants	were	
located	 in	 the	 medium‐high	 range	 of	 the	 Mexican	 wage	 distribution.	 The	 finding	 of	
intermediate	 selection	 in	 the	 Mexican	 context	 does	 not	 seem	 consistent	 with	 the	 basic	
implications	of	 the	Roy	model	 because	 the	 rate	of	 return	 to	 skills	 is	 far	 larger	 in	Mexico	
than	 in	 the	United	States.	More	recent	 studies	by	Fernández‐Huertas	Moraga	 (2011)	and	
Kaestner	 and	 Malamud	 (2014)	 use	 survey	 data	 that	 report	 the	 actual	 pre‐migration	
earnings	 and	 find	 evidence	 of	 negative	 selection.	 They	 also	 conclude	 that	 part	 of	 the	
negative	 selection	 can	 be	 traced	 to	 the	 unobservable	 characteristics	 that	 determine	 a	
migrant’s	earnings.		
	
The	 important	 role	 played	 by	 unobservable	 characteristics	 implies	 that	 constructing	 a	
counterfactual	earnings	distribution	 for	 the	migrants	based	on	observable	characteristics	
can	greatly	bias	the	nature	of	the	selection	revealed	by	the	data.	Our	findings	suggest	that	
the	use	of	 such	a	 counterfactual	distribution	will	 tend	 to	understate	 the	 true	 selection	 in	
earnings,	so	that	the	selection	implied	by	the	counterfactual	distribution	is	far	weaker	than	
the	 true	 selection—regardless	 of	 whether	 there	 is	 positive	 or	 negative	 selection.	 The	
numerical	bias	that	results	from	using	the	counterfactual	estimation	is	sizable	in	the	Danish	
context:	more	 than	half	 of	 the	 difference	between	 the	 earnings	 distributions	 of	migrants	
and	non‐migrants	arises	because	of	differences	in	unobserved	characteristics.	
	
The	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	Section	2	sketches	the	economic	theory	underlying	the	
analysis	 and	 derives	 theoretical	 predictions	 concerning	 the	 self‐selection	 of	 emigrants,	
using	 the	notion	of	 stochastic	dominance	as	a	unifying	concept.	Section	3	 introduces	and	
describes	 the	 unique	 population	 data	 that	we	 use	 and	 reports	 some	 summary	 statistics.	
Sections	4	and	5	present	the	main	empirical	findings.	In	section	4,	we	examine	the	selection	
in	 terms	of	 observed	pre‐migration	earnings.	We	present	 a	 statistical	method	 for	 testing	
the	 theoretical	 implication	 that	 the	 earnings	 distribution	 of	 the	 emigrants	 should	
stochastically	 dominate	 the	 corresponding	 distribution	 of	 the	 non‐migrants.	 Section	 5	
extends	 the	 empirical	 work	 by	 examining	 the	 selection	 that	 occurs	 in	 the	 unobserved	
component	 of	 earnings.	 We	 also	 evaluate	 the	 bias	 that	 results	 from	 predicting	 the	 pre‐
migration	earnings	of	emigrants	from	the	earnings	distribution	of	non‐migrants.	Section	6	
examines	whether	the	selection	of	persons	moving	to	other	EU15	countries	differs	from	the	
selection	of	migrants	moving	to	countries	where	immigration	restrictions	come	into	play.	
We	find	that	immigration	restrictions	have	little	effect	on	the	selection	of	emigrants.	Finally,	
Section	7	summarizes	the	study	and	draws	some	lessons	for	future	research.	
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1.2	Theoretical	framework	
	
Previous	 literature	 on	 the	 self‐selection	 of	 migrants	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 conditional	
expectations	 of	 earnings	 distributions	 among	 migrants	 and	 stayers.	 In	 this	 section,	 we	
derive	 a	 novel	 result:	 the	 Roy	model	 implies	 that	 under	 certain	 conditions,	 the	 earnings	
distribution	of	migrants	first‐order	stochastically	dominates,	or	is	stochastically	dominated	
by,	the	earnings	distribution	of	stayers.	In	a	bivariate	normal	framework,	it	turns	out	that	
the	 conditions	 required	 for	 stochastic	 dominance	 are	 identical	 to	 the	 conditions	 that	
determine	the	nature	of	self‐selection	in	terms	of	expected	earnings.	
	
We	 also	 decompose	 self‐selection	 into	 two	 components,	 one	 that	 is	 determined	 by	
differences	in	returns	to	observable	skills	between	source	and	host	country,	and	one	that	is	
determined	by	differences	in	unobservable	skills.	The	distinction	between	observable	and	
unobservable	skills,	of	course,	depends	on	the	empirical	framework	and	on	the	data	that	is	
being	used;	observable	skills	include	the	variables	explaining	earnings	that	are	included	in	
the	 data,	 while	 the	 component	 of	 earnings	 that	 is	 left	 unexplained	 by	 the	 data	 is	 the	
unobservable	 skill	 component.	 Even	 though	 the	 content	 of	 the	 two	 components	 differs	
among	 data	 sets,	 we	 show	 that	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 a	major	 part	 of	 migrant	 self‐selection	 is	
determined	by	the	unobservable	component	simply	because	“observables”	tend	to	explain	
a	relatively	small	fraction	of	the	variance	in	earnings.		
	
We	take	as	our	starting	point	the	migration	decision	faced	by	potential	migrants	in	a	two‐
country	framework,	in	line	with	Borjas	(1987)	and	subsequent	literature.	Residents	of	the	
source	country	(country	0)	consider	migrating	to	the	destination	country	(country	1),	and	
the	migration	decision	is	assumed	to	be	irreversible.	To	simplify	the	presentation,	we	focus	
on	 a	 single	 observed	 skill	 characteristic	 s	 and	 suppress	 the	 subscript	 that	 indexes	 a	
particular	 individual.	 For	 concreteness,	 the	 variable	 s	 can	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 giving	 the	
worker’s	 years	 of	 educational	 attainment,	 but	 it	 includes	 all	 the	 characteristics	 affecting	
individual’s	income	that	are	observed	in	a	given	set	of	data.	Residents	of	the	source	country	
face	the	earnings	distribution:	
	
(1.1)	 	 log 	 	 	
	
 
where	w0	 gives	 the	wage	 in	 the	 source	 country;	r0	gives	 the	 rate	of	 return	 to	observable	
skills;	 and	 the	 random	 variable	 0	 measures	 individual‐specific	 productivity	 shocks	
resulting	from	unobserved	characteristics	and	is	normally	distributed	with	mean	zero	and	
variance	 .	 The	 distribution	 of	 observable	 skills	 in	 the	 source	 country’s	 population	 is	
given	 by	 s	 =	 s	 +	 s,	 where	 the	 random	 variable	 s	 is	 also	 assumed	 to	 be	 normally	
distributed	with	mean	zero	and	variance	 .	
	 	
If	the	entire	population	of	the	source	country	were	to	migrate,	this	population	would	face	
the	earnings	distribution:	
	
 0
2
 s
2
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(1.2)	 	 log 	
 
where	the	random	variable	1	is	normally	distributed	with	mean	zero	and	variance	
2
1 .	
	
For	 analytical	 convenience,	 we	 assume	 that	 Cov(0,	 s)	 =	 Cov(1,	 s)	 =	 0,	 so	 that	 the	
individual‐specific	unobserved	productivity	shocks	(i.e.,	the	“residuals”	from	the	regression	
line)	are	independent	from	observable	characteristics.5	The	correlation	coefficient	between	
0	 and	 1	 equals	 01.	 It	 is	 also	 worth	 noticing	 that	 the	 random	 variable	 s	 is	 individual‐
specific	and	has	the	same	value	for	the	same	individual	in	both	countries,	whereas	0	and	1	
are	both	individual‐	and	country‐specific.	
	 	
Equations	 (1.1)	 and	 (1.2)	 completely	 describe	 the	 earnings	 opportunities	 available	 to	
persons	born	in	the	source	country.	Assume	that	the	migration	decision	is	determined	by	a	
comparison	of	earnings	opportunities	across	countries	net	of	migration	costs	C.	Define	the	
index	function:	
	
(1.3)	 	 log 	
																														 ∆ ,	
	 	
where		gives	a	“time‐equivalent”	measure	of	migration	costs	(	=	C/w0).	The	cross‐country	
difference	 in	 earnings	 net	 of	 the	 time‐equivalent	 migration	 cost	 for	 an	 individual	 with	
average	observed	and	unobserved	characteristics	is	given	by		
	 =	 [(1	 –	0)	 +	 (r1	 –	 r0)	s	 –	].	 The	 difference	 in	 earnings	 attributable	 to	 	 individual	
deviation	from	average	characteristics	is	given	by	 ,	where	vi	=	(ri	s	+	i).	A	person	
emigrates	if	the	index	I	>	0,	and	remains	in	the	origin	country	otherwise.	
	 	
Migration	costs	probably	vary	among	persons	—	but	 the	sign	of	 the	correlation	between	
costs	 (whether	 in	 dollars	 or	 in	 time‐equivalent	 terms)	 and	 skills	 (both	 observed	 and	
unobserved)	is	ambiguous	and	difficult	to	determine.	The	heterogeneity	in	migration	costs	
can	be	incorporated	to	the	model	by	assuming	that	the	distribution	of	the	random	variable	
	 in	the	source	country’s	population	is	given	by		=		+		,	where		 is	the	mean	level	of	
migration	 costs	 in	 the	population,	 and		 is	 a	normally	distributed	 random	variable	with	
mean	zero	and	variance	 .	However,	Borjas	(1987)	and	Chiquiar	and	Hanson	(2005)	show	
that	time‐equivalent	migration	costs	do	not	play	a	role	in	the	algorithm	that	determines	the	
selection	of	emigrants	if	either	those	costs	are	constant	(so	that	 2 	=	0),	or	if	the	costs	are	
uncorrelated	 with	 skills.	 For	 analytical	 convenience,	 we	 assume	 that	 time‐equivalent	
																																																								
5	A	more	realistic	assumption	would	be	that	the	correlation	between	observed	and	unobserved	skills	
is	positive.	However,	allowing	for	positive	correlation	does	not	change	the	qualitative	predictions	of	the	
model.	

2
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migration	costs	are	constant,	so	that		=	.6	The	outmigration	rate	from	the	source	country	
is	then	given	by:	
	
(1.4)	 	 0 ∗ ∆ ∗ 1 ∆ ∗ ,	
 
where	v*	=	(v1		v0)/v	is	a	standard	normal	random	variable;	*	=	/v;	
2
v 	=	Var(v1	–	
v0);	and		is	the	standard	normal	distribution	function.7		
	 	
In	addition	to	 identifying	the	determinants	of	the	outmigration	rate	in	equation	(1.4),	the	
Roy	 model	 lets	 us	 examine	which	 persons	 find	 it	 most	 worthwhile	 to	 leave	 the	 source	
country.8 	In	 the	 following,	 we	 examine	 the	 self‐selection	 of	 emigrants	 along	 two	
dimensions:	selection	in	terms	of	observable	skills	s	and	selection	in	terms	of	unobservable	
skills	0,	which	together	combine	into	selection	in	terms	of	total	productivity	or	earnings,	as	
measured	by	log	w0.		
	
Let	 FM(z)	 and	 FN(z)	 represent	 the	 (cumulative)	 probability	 distributions	 of	 skills	 or	
earnings	 for	 migrants	 and	 non‐migrants	 in	 the	 source	 country,	 respectively,	 where	 z	
denotes	a	particular	measure	of	skills	(e.g.,	observable	or	unobservable	characteristics	or	
income).	 By	 definition,	 the	 probability	 distribution	 of	 migrants	 FM(z)	 first‐order	
stochastically	dominates	that	of	stayers	FN(z)	if:9	
	
(1.5)	 	 ∀	 ,	
	
and	 there	 is	 at	 least	 one	 value	 of	 	for	 which	 a	 strict	 inequality	 holds.	 From	 now	 on,	
whenever	we	refer	to	stochastic	dominance,	we	mean	first‐order	stochastic	dominance.		
	
Equation	(1.5)	implies	that	a	larger	fraction	of	the	migrants	have	skills	above	any	threshold	
z*.	 Put	 differently,	 for	 any	 level	 of	 skills	 z*,	 the	 population	 described	 by	 the	 probability	
																																																								
6	If	 	were	negatively	correlated	with	skills,	the	negative	correlation	would	tend	to	induce	the	more	
skilled	to	migrate,	creating	a	positively	selected	migrant	flow.	This	would	strengthen	positive	self‐selection,	
and	weaken	negative	self‐selection.		
7	It	is	straightforward	to	study	equation	(1.4)	to	confirm	that	the	migration	rate	rises,	when	mean	
income	in	the	source	country	falls,	mean	income	in	the	host	country	rises,	returns	to	observed	skills	in	the	
source	country	fall,	returns	to	observed	skills	in	the	host	country	rise,	time‐equivalent	migration	costs	fall	and	
when	mean	observed	skills	rise	if	r1	>	r0	or	fall	if	r1	<	r0.	
8	Throughout	the	analysis,	we	assume	that	*	is	constant.	The	migration	flow	is	effectively	assumed	
to	be	sufficiently	small	that	there	are	no	feedback	effects	on	the	labor	markets	of	either	the	source	or	
destination	countries.	
9	An	alternative	and	perhaps	more	intuitive	definition	of	stochastic	dominance	is	in	terms	of	
quantiles.	Let	 	and	 	be	the	quantile	functions	of	order	 of	the	skill	distributions	of	migrants	and	
non‐migrants.	FM(z)	stochastically	dominates	FN(z)	if	and	only	if	 	for	all	0 1	and	there	
is	at	least	one	value	of	 	for	which	a	strict	inequality	holds.		
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distribution	FM	is	more	skilled	because	a	larger	fraction	of	the	group	exceeds	that	threshold.	
The	migrants,	in	short,	are	positively	selected.	Negative	selection,	of	course,	would	occur	if	
the	reverse	was	true	and	 	 		z,	with	a	strict	inequality	holding	for	at	least	one	
value	of	 .	
	
If	 the	 skill	 distribution	 of	 migrants	 stochastically	 dominates	 that	 of	 non‐migrants,	 the	
stochastic	 dominance	 then	 also	 implies	 the	 typical	 definition	 of	 positive	 selection	 that	 is	
based	on	conditional	expectations:	
	
(1.6)	 	 | 0 | 0 ,	
	
so	 that	migrants,	on	average,	are	more	skilled	 than	stayers.	Conversely,	 if	 the	probability	
distribution	 of	 stayers	 stochastically	 dominates	 that	 of	migrants,	 and	 there	was	 negative	
selection,	it	would	also	follow	that	 | 0 | 0 .	The	converse,	however,	is	not	
true	for	a	general	distribution:	A	claim	of	positive	selection	in	expectations,	as	defined	by	
equation	 (1.6),	 does	 not	 imply	 that	 the	 skill	 distribution	 of	 migrants	 stochastically	
dominates	that	of	non‐migrants.		
	
To	derive	the	stochastic	ordering	of	the	skill	distributions	of	migrants	and	non‐migrants,	let	
f(x,	v)	 be	 a	bivariate	normal	density	 function,	with	means	 (x,	v),	 variances	
2 2( , )x v  	and	
correlation	 coefficient	 .	 Further,	 let	 the	 random	 variable	 v	 be	 truncated	 from	 below	 at	
point	a	 and	 from	 above	 at	 point	b.	 Arnold	 et	 al.	 (1993,	 p.473)	 show	 that	 the	 (marginal)	
moment	 generating	 function	 of	 the	 standardized	 random	 variable	 (x	 ‐	x)/x,	 given	 the	
truncation	of	v,	is	given	by:	
	
(1.7)	 	 / ,	
		
	
where		=	(a	–	v)/v;	and		=	(b	–	v)v.	
	 	
In	terms	of	the	migration	decision,	the	truncation	in	the	random	variable	v	=	v1	–	v0	in	the	
sample	of	migrants	is	from	below	and	implies	that		=	–*=	k,	and		=	,	where	k	is	the	
truncation	 point.	 In	 the	 sample	 of	 stayers,	 the	 truncation	 in	 v	 is	 from	 above,	 and	 the	
truncation	points	are		=	–	and		=	k.	By	substituting	these	definitions	into	equation	(1.7),	
it	can	be	shown	that	the	moment	generating	functions	for	the	random	variable	giving	the	
conditional	distribution	of	skill	characteristic	x	for	migrants	and	stayers	reduce	to:	
	
	
	
(1.8)	 	
1 Φ
1 Φ
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and	
	
(1.9)	 	
Φ
Φ
.	
	
	
	
Consider	any	two	normal	distribution	functions	F(z)	and	G(z).	Thistle	(1993,	p.	307)	shows	
that	F	will	stochastically	dominate	G	if	and	only	if:	
	
(1.10)	 	 	 , ∀	 0,	
	
where	mF	 is	 the	 moment	 generating	 function	 associated	 with	 distribution	 F;	mG	 is	 the	
moment	generating	function	associated	with	G.	
	
The	 ranking	 of	 the	 moment	 generating	 functions	 in	 equation	 (1.10)	 implies	 we	 can	
determine	the	stochastic	ranking	of	the	two	distributions	by	simply	solving	for	the	relevant	
correlation	 coefficient	 ,	 and	 comparing	 equations	 (1.8)	 and	 (1.9).	 Such	 a	 comparison	
implies	that:	
	
(1.11)	 	 	 ,							 								 0	
	 	 	 ,							 								 0.	
	
	
In	 other	 words,	 migrants	 are	 positively	 selected	 if	 	 >	 0,	 and	 are	 negatively	 selected	
otherwise.	 Consider	 initially	 the	 stochastic	 ranking	 in	 observable	 characteristics.	 The	
random	variable	x	=	s,	and	the	relevant	correlation	coefficient		is	defined	by:	
	
(1.12)	 	 , 1 .	
	
	
Equation	(1.12)	shows	that	the	stochastic	ordering	of	the	distributions	of	observable	skills	
of	 migrants	 and	 non‐migrants	 depends	 only	 on	 international	 differences	 in	 the	 rate	 of	
return	 to	observable	skills.	The	skill	distribution	of	migrants	will	 stochastically	dominate	
that	 of	 stayers	 when	 the	 rate	 of	 return	 to	 skills	 is	 higher	 abroad.	 Conversely,	 the	 skill	
distribution	 for	non‐migrants	will	stochastically	dominate	 the	distribution	for	migrants	 if	
the	rate	of	return	to	observable	skills	is	larger	at	home.	
	
Consider	next	the	stochastic	ordering	in	the	conditional	distributions	of	unobservable	skills	
0.	The	relevant	correlation	for	determining	this	type	of	selection	is	given	by:	
	
(1.13)	 	 	 , 1 .	
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It	follows	that	the	distribution	of	unobservable	skills	for	migrants	stochastically	dominates	
that	 for	 non‐migrants	 when	 	 1.	 Note	 that	 the	 necessary	 condition	 for	 positive	
selection	has	two	components.	First,	the	unobserved	characteristics	must	be	“transferable”	
across	countries,	so	that	01	is	sufficiently	high.	Second,	the	residual	variance	in	earnings	is	
larger	in	the	destination	country	than	in	the	source	country.	The	residual	variances	 20 	and	
2
1 ,	of	course,	measure	the	“price”	of	unobserved	characteristics:	the	greater	the	rewards	to	
unobserved	 skills,	 the	 larger	 the	 residual	 inequality	 in	 wages.10	As	 long	 as	 unobserved	
characteristics	 are	 sufficiently	 transferable	 across	 countries,	 emigrants	 are	 positively	
selected	when	the	rate	of	return	to	unobservable	skills	is	higher	in	the	destination.		
	
Finally,	consider	the	stochastic	ranking	in	“total”	productivity.	The	earnings	distribution	in	
the	source	country	given	by	equation	(1.1)	can	be	rewritten	as:	
	
(1.14)	 	 log	 0	 	 α0	 	 0	μs 	 	 0	ε 	 	ε0 	 	 α0	 	 0	μ 	 	 0,	
	
where	 the	normally	distributed	random	variable	v0	has	mean	zero	and	variance	
2
0v .	The	
relevant	correlation	for	determining	the	stochastic	ranking	of	the	earnings	distributions	of	
migrants	and	non‐migrants	is:	
	
(1.15)	 	 , 1 1 1 ,	
	
where	 ⁄ 	and	1 ⁄ .	
	
The	sign	of	the	correlation	in	equation	(1.15),	which	determines	the	nature	of	the	selection	
in	pre‐migration	earnings,	depends	on	the	sign	of	a	weighted	average	of	the	selection	that	
occurs	 in	 observable	 and	 unobservable	 characteristics.	 Interestingly,	 the	 weight	 is	 the	
fraction	of	the	variance	in	earnings	that	can	be	attributed	to	differences	in	observable	and	
unobservable	characteristics,	respectively.	
	
If	there	is	positive	(negative)	selection	in	both	“primitive”	types	of	skills,	there	will	then	be	
positive	 (negative)	 selection	 in	 pre‐migration	 earnings.	 If,	 however,	 there	 are	 different	
types	of	 selection	 in	 the	 two	 types	of	 skills,	 the	 selection	 in	 each	 type	 is	weighted	by	 its	
importance	 in	 creating	 the	 variance	 of	 the	 earnings	 distribution.	 It	 is	 well	 known	 that	
observable	 characteristics	 (such	 as	 educational	 attainment)	 explain	 a	 relatively	 small	
fraction	of	the	variance	in	earnings	(perhaps	less	than	a	third).	As	a	result,	equation	(1.15)	
implies	that	it	is	the	selection	in	unobservables	that	is	most	likely	to	determine	the	nature	of	
the	 selection	 in	 the	 pre‐migration	 earnings	 of	 emigrants.	 This	 implication	 plays	 an	
																																																								
10	This	interpretation	of	the	variances	follows	from	the	definition	of	the	log	wage	distribution	in	the	
host	country	in	terms	of	what	the	population	of	the	source	country	would	earn	if	the	entire	population	
migrated	there.	This	definition	effectively	holds	constant	the	distribution	of	skills.	
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important	 role	 in	 explaining	 why	 the	 evidence	 reported	 in	 Fernández‐Huertas	 Moraga	
(2011)	 and	 Kaestner	 and	 Malamud	 (2014)	 conflicts	 with	 that	 of	 Chiquiar	 and	 Hanson	
(2005).	
	
As	mentioned	earlier,	the	stochastic	dominance	results	necessarily	imply	selection	in	terms	
of	conditional	expectations.	In	the	case	of	bivariate	normal	distributions,	it	follows	that	the	
expectation	of	the	earnings	distribution	of	migrants	E(log	w0	|	v*	>	*)	is	given	by:	
	
(1.16)	 | ∗ Δ ∗ 1 Δ ∗ 1 Δ ∗ ,	
	
	
where	*)	=	(*)/[1		(*)]	>	0,	 and		is	 the	density	of	 the	standard	normal	
distribution.	As	can	be	seen	by	examining	equation	 (1.16),	 the	 conditions	 that	determine	
the	 quality	 of	 self‐selection	 in	 terms	 of	 expectations	 are	 the	 same	 as	 the	 conditions	 that	
determine	the	stochastic	ordering	of	the	skill	distributions	of	migrants	and	non‐migrants.	
In	 the	normal	distribution	 framework	 that	underlies	 the	 canonical	Roy	model,	 stochastic	
dominance	implies	selection	in	expectations,	and	vice	versa.	
	
In	empirical	 applications,	however,	 the	prediction	of	 stochastic	dominance	 is	 likely	 to	be	
much	 less	 robust	 than	 the	predictions	 concerning	expectations	and	 testing	 for	 stochastic	
dominance	will	require	a	more	rigorous	test	than	simply	comparing	the	average	incomes	or	
skills	 of	 migrants	 and	 non‐migrants.	 If	 one	 just	 compares	 the	 averages	 to	 find	 out	 how	
migrants	are	self‐selected,	the	findings	can	be	compatible	with	the	predictions	of	the	Roy‐
model	 even	 if	 a	 large	 number	 of	 individuals	 in	 the	 data	 behave	 against	 the	 stochastic	
dominance	 predictions	 of	 the	 model.	 As	 a	 result,	 establishing	 an	 empirical	 pattern	 of	
stochastic	 dominance	 provides	 very	 strong	 evidence	 that	 differences	 in	 skill	 prices	 are	
indeed	important	in	migration	decisions.		
	
	
1.3	Data	
	
Our	analysis	uses	 register	data	 for	 the	entire	Danish	population	 from	1995	 to	2001.	The	
data	 is	 maintained	 and	 provided	 by	 Statistics	 Denmark	 and	 it	 derives	 from	 the	
administrative	 registers	 of	 governmental	 agencies	 that	 are	merged	using	 a	 unique	 social	
security	number.11		
	
For	each	year	between	1995	and	2004,	we	 identified	all	Danish	citizens	aged	25‐54	who	
lived	in	Denmark	during	the	entire	calendar	year.12	We	restrict	the	analysis	to	persons	who	
																																																								
11	All	residents	in	Denmark	are	legally	required	to	have	a	social	security	number.	This	number	is	
necessary	to	many	activities	in	daily	life,	including	opening	a	bank	account,	receiving	wages	and	salaries	or	
social	assistance,	obtaining	health	care,	and	enrolling	in	school.	
12	A	person’s	age	is	measured	as	of	January	1st	the	year	after	the	reference	year.	
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worked	 full	 time.13	Migration	 decisions	 of	 part‐time	 workers	 or	 of	 workers	 outside	 the	
labor	force	may	be	driven	by	different	factors,	and	the	observed	income	of	these	workers	
may	not	be	indicative	of	their	true	earnings	potential.	The	income	variable	for	each	year	is	
constructed	 by	 adding	 the	 worker’s	 annual	 gross	 labor	 income	 and	 positive	 values	 of	
freelance	income.14		
	
We	 merged	 this	 information	 with	 data	 from	 the	 migration	 register	 for	 the	 years	 1995	
through	 2006.	 The	migration	 register	 reports	 the	 date	 of	 emigration	 and	 the	 country	 of	
destination.	Even	though	it	is	possible	for	Danish	citizens	to	emigrate	without	registering,	
we	expect	 that	 the	numbers	of	persons	who	do	so	 is	 small	as	 it	 is	mandatory	 for	Danish	
citizens	 to	 report	 emigration	 decisions.	 Danish	 tax	 laws	 provide	 further	 incentives	 for	
migrants	to	register	emigration	decisions.	
	
After	identifying	the	population	of	interest,	we	determined	for	each	person	whether	he	or	
she	 emigrated	 from	 Denmark	 during	 the	 following	 calendar	 year.	 If	 we	 found	 that	 a	
particular	 person	 emigrated,	 we	 searched	 for	 the	 person	 in	 the	 migration	 register	 for	
subsequent	years	 to	determine	 if	 the	migrant	 returned	 to	Denmark	at	 some	point	 in	 the	
future,	and	recorded	the	date	of	possible	return	migration.	The	migration	register	includes	
near‐complete	information	on	return	migration,	as	registration	in	Denmark	is	required	for	
the	return	migrant	to	be	eligible	for	income	transfers	and	to	be	covered	by	national	health	
insurance.	
	
To	 focus	on	migration	decisions	 that	are	permanent	 in	nature,	we	restrict	 the	analysis	 to	
migration	spells	that	are	at	least	five	years	long.15	We	define	a	migrant	as	an	individual	who	
is	found	in	one	of	the	1995‐2004	cross‐sections,	who	emigrates	from	Denmark	during	the	
following	 year	 to	 destinations	 outside	 Greenland	 or	 the	 Faroe	 Islands,	 and	 who	 stays	
abroad	 for	 at	 least	 five	 years.16	Individuals	who	 emigrated	 for	 less	 than	 five	 years	were	
																																																								
13	The	administrative	data	allows	the	calculation	of	a	variable	that	measures	the	amount	of	“work	
experienced	gained”	during	the	calendar	year.	The	maximum	possible	value	for	this	variable	is	1,000.	We	
restrict	our	sample	to	workers	who	have	a	value	of	900	or	above,	so	that	our	sample	roughly	consists	of	
persons	who	worked	full	time	at	least	90	percent	of	the	year.	In	order	to	measure	the	work	experience	gained	
during	a	given	year,	we	subtract	the	value	from	the	previous	year	from	the	current	value	of	the	variable.	
Persons	who	had	a	missing	value	for	work	experience	in	either	of	the	two	years	were	dropped	from	the	
sample.	Missing	values	in	this	variable	typically	indicate	that	the	person	spent	time	abroad.	
14	The	information	on	earnings	is	taken	from	the	tax	records	for	each	calendar	year.	Also	this	
variable	is	considered	to	be	of	high	quality	by	Statistics	Denmark.	Some	persons	also	report	negative	values	
for	freelance	income.	These	negative	values	are	likely	to	be	due	to	losses	arising	from	investments	and	do	not	
reflect	the	productive	characteristics	of	the	individual.	
15	Having	stayed	abroad	for	five	years	predicts	longer	migration	spells.	For	example	72%	of	men	and	
71%	of	women	who	left	Denmark	in	1996	and	were	still	abroad	after	five	years	were	also	abroad	after	ten	
years.	
16	Greenland	and	the	Faroe	Islands	are	autonomous	regions	but	still	part	of	Denmark.	We	have	
excluded	these	destinations	as	many	of	these	migrants	could	have	originated	in	Greenland	or	Faroe	Islands,	
and	many	would	actually	be	returning	home	rather	than	emigrating	from	Denmark.	The	exact	duration	
requirements	were	1,825	days	or	longer	for	long‐term	migrants. 
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removed	from	the	data,	and	the	rest	of	the	population	is	then	classified	as	non‐migrants17	
The	analysis	of	both	migrants	and	non‐migrants	is	further	restricted	to	only	include	Danish	
citizens	who	do	not	have	an	“immigration	background.”18	
	
Table	 1.1	 reports	 summary	 statistics	 from	 the	 Danish	 register	 data.	 The	 panel	 data	 set	
contains	over	6.4	million	male	and	5.1	million	female	non‐migrants.	The	construction	of	the	
data	implies	that	non‐migrants	appear	in	the	data	multiple	times	(potentially	once	in	each	
cross‐section	 between	 1995	 and	 2004).	 We	 were	 able	 to	 identify	 7323	 male	 and	 3436	
female	migrants.	By	construction,	these	migrants	are	persons	who	we	first	observe	residing	
in	Denmark	and	who	left	the	country	at	some	point	between	1996	and	2005.	As	Table	1.1	
shows,	 the	 Danish	 emigrants	 are	 younger	 than	 the	 non‐migrants,	 regardless	 of	 gender.	
Despite	the	age	difference,	the	emigrants	earned	higher	annual	incomes	in	the	year	prior	to	
the	migration	than	the	non‐migrants.	
	
We	construct	a	 simple	measure	of	 “standardized	earnings”	 that	adjusts	 for	differences	 in	
age,	gender,	and	period	effects.	Standardized	earnings	are	defined	by	the	ratio	of	a	worker’s	
annual	gross	earnings	to	the	mean	gross	earnings	of	workers	of	the	same	age	and	gender	
during	the	calendar	year.19	Table	1.1	shows	that	emigrants	earn	more	than	non‐migrants	in	
terms	of	standardized	earnings.	In	particular,	male	emigrants	earn	about	30	percent	more	
than	non‐migrants,	and	female	emigrants	earn	about	20	percent	more.	
	
Table	 1.2	 reports	 the	 number	 of	 emigrants	moving	 to	 different	 destinations.	 The	 largest	
destinations	for	both	men	and	women	are	two	other	Nordic	countries,	Sweden	and	Norway,	
as	 well	 as	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 and	 Germany.20	These	 five	 countries	
account	for	57	percent	of	all	emigration.	
	
Finally,	 it	 is	 also	 interesting	 to	 summarize	 the	 link	 between	 education	 and	 emigration.	
Table	1.3	reports	the	education	distributions	for	non‐migrants	and	migrants.	It	 is	evident	
that	the	migrants	tend	to	be	more	educated	than	the	non‐migrants,	among	both	men	and	
women.	 For	 example,	 50	 percent	 of	 Danish	 (male)	 non‐migrants	 have	 a	 vocational	
education,	 as	 compared	 to	 only	 30	 percent	 of	 emigrants	 to	 non‐Nordic	 destinations.	
Similarly, the fraction of male migrants to non-Nordic destinations with a Master’s degree is 24 
percent, whereas only 7 percent of male non-migrants have a master’s degree. 
																																																								
17	We	also	examined	the	selection	of	short‐term	migrants	and	the	qualitative	results	are	similar	to	
those	reported	below,	although	the	intensity	of	selection	is	weaker.	
18	Statistics	Denmark	defines	a	person	to	have	“no	immigrant	background”	if	at	least	one	of	the	
parents	was	born	in	Denmark	and	the	person	is/was	a	Danish	citizen.	We	searched	the	population	registers	
from	1980	to	2010	for	the	parents	of	the	persons	in	our	sample,	and	if	a	parent	was	found	he	or	she	was	
required	to	be	a	Dane	with	no	immigrant	background	as	well.		
19	Both	migrants	and	non‐migrants,	as	well	as	shorter‐term	migrants,	are	included	in	these	
calculations.	
20	If	we	relax	the	constraints	on	labor	market	status	and	age	to	enter	the	sample,	the	United	Kingdom	
emerges	as	the	largest	destination	because	of	the	large	number	of	Danish	students	who	pursue	their	
education	there. 	
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In order to add time dimension, we compute the difference between the average of the log 
standardized earnings, or a degree of selection, for migrants and non-migrants for each year from 
1995 to 2004 for men and women separately. The results are reported in figures 1.1a and 1.1b. 
There is a downward trend in the difference for both men and women. The finding makes sense: 
when the migrants are positively self-selected and the emigration rate gets bigger the average 
standardized earnings of migrants should get smaller. The variation across years is however 
small, so pooling the data is justified. The evolution of the emigration rate is presented in figure 
1.2a for men and in figure 1.2b for women separately for the whole population and for those with 
higher education and those without higher education. As we are looking at long-term migration, 
the emigration rates are small, but there is an upward trend. The rate is higher for men and for 
those with higher education. 
 
	To	 summarize,	 the	 descriptive	 findings	 suggest	 a	 strong	 degree	 of	 positive	 selection	 ‐at	
least	as	measured	by	education	and	differences	in	the	conditional	means	of	earnings.	
	
	
1.4	Selection	in	pre‐migration	earnings	
	
This	section	presents	empirical	evidence	on	the	self‐selection	of	emigrants	from	Denmark	
in	terms	of	standardized	pre‐emigration	earnings.	The	main	empirical	finding	is	that	long‐
term	 emigrants	 from	 Denmark	 were,	 in	 general,	 much	 more	 productive	 prior	 to	 their	
migration	than	individuals	who	chose	to	stay.		
	
Of	course,	 the	summary	statistics	reported	in	Table	1.1	already	suggest	positive	selection	
among	 emigrants	 because	 their	 standardized	 earnings	 exceeded	 those	 of	 non‐migrants.	
However,	 differences	 in	 conditional	 averages	 could	 be	 masking	 substantial	 differences	
between	the	underlying	probability	distributions.	Our	theoretical	framework	predicts	that	
the	 distribution	 of	 earnings	 for	 migrants	 should	 stochastically	 dominate	 that	 of	 non‐
migrants.	 	As	a	result,	our	empirical	analysis	will	mainly	consist	of	comparing	cumulative	
distributions	of	standardized	earnings	between	migrants	and	non‐migrants.	An	advantage	
of	simply	graphing	and	examining	the	cumulative	distributions	is	that	the	analysis	does	not	
require	 any	 type	 of	 kernel	 density	 estimation,	 and	 that	 we	 do	 not	 need	 to	 impose	 any	
statistical	 assumptions	 or	 parametric	 structure	 on	 the	 data.	We	will	 also	 present	 kernel	
density	estimates	of	the	earnings	density	functions	as	an	alternative	way	of	presenting	the	
key	 insights.	 Finally,	 we	 will	 derive	 and	 report	 statistical	 tests	 to	 determine	 if	 the	 data	
support	the	theoretical	prediction	of	stochastic	dominance.	
	
Figure	1.3a	 illustrates	 the	 cumulative	 earnings	distributions	 for	male	migrants	 to	Nordic	
countries,	 male	 migrants	 to	 destinations	 outside	 Nordic	 countries,	 and	 for	 male	 non‐
migrants.	The	values	of	 the	 standardized	earnings	are	 truncated	at	 ‐2	and	2	 to	make	 the	
graphs	more	tractable.	The	 figure	confirms	that	migrants	were	positively	selected	during	
the	 study	 period.	 The	 cumulative	 distribution	 function	 of	 standardized	 earnings	 of	
migrants	to	destinations	outside	the	Nordic	countries	is	clearly	located	to	the	right	of	the	
corresponding	 cumulative	 distribution	 for	 non‐migrants,	 as	 would	 be	 the	 case	 if	 the	
cumulative	 distribution	 of	 migrants	 stochastically	 dominates	 that	 of	 non‐migrants.	 The	
16 
 
figure	also	shows	 that	 the	distribution	 function	 for	migrants	 to	other	Nordic	 countries	 is	
located	 to	 the	 right	 of	 that	 for	 non‐migrants.	 However	 the	 selection	 of	 the	 migrants	 to	
Nordic	countries	seems	weaker.	This	weaker	selection	may	arise	because	the	rate	of	return	
to	 skills	 in	 Nordic	 countries	 is	 relatively	 low	when	 compared	 to	 that	 in	 other	 potential	
destinations.21	Figure	1.3b	presents	corresponding	evidence	for	women.	The	main	findings	
are	qualitatively	similar,	but	the	positive	selection	seems	weaker.		
						
Figure	 1.4a	 presents	 the	 corresponding	 kernel	 estimates	 of	 the	 density	 functions	 of	 the	
logarithm	 of	 standardized	 earnings	 for	 men,	 while	 Figure	 1.4b	 presents	 the	 respective	
graphs	for	women.22	The	density	functions	again	reveal	the	positive	selection	of	migrants	
moving	outside	the	Nordic	countries,	both	for	men	and	women.		
	
As	 is	 evident	 from	 the	 figures,	 Kolmogorov‐Smirnov	 tests	 comparing	 the	 earnings	
distributions	 for	 different	 groups	 rejected	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 the	 underlying	 earnings	
distributions	 are	 the	 same	 at	 a	 highly	 significant	 level.	 In	 addition	 to	 showing	 that	 the	
cumulative	 distributions	 are	 different,	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	 determine	 if	 the	 evidence	
statistically	supports	the	theoretical	prediction	that	the	cumulative	distribution	function	of	
migrants	 stochastically	 dominates	 that	 of	 non‐migrants.	 Statistical	 tests	 for	 first‐order	
stochastic	dominance	are	highly	sensitive	to	small	changes	in	the	underlying	distributions,	
making	 it	 difficult	 to	 rank	 distributions	 in	 many	 empirical	 applications.23	As	 noted	 by	
Davidson	and	Duclos	(2013),	it	may	be	impossible	to	infer	stochastic	dominance	over	the	
full	support	of	empirical	distributions	if	the	distributions	are	continuous	in	the	tails,	simply	
because	there	is	not	enough	information	in	the	tails	for	meaningful	testing	of	any	statistical	
hypothesis.	 It	 would	 then	 make	 sense	 to	 focus	 on	 testing	 stochastic	 dominance	 over	 a	
restricted	 range	 of	 the	 distribution.	We	 apply	 an	 approach	 that	 characterizes	 the	 range	
over	which	 the	 value	of	 cumulative	 distribution	 function	 for	non‐migrants	 is	 statistically	
significantly	bigger	than	that	of	non‐migrants.		
	
In	 particular,	 we	 calculate	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 cumulative	 distribution	 functions	
with	 confidence	 intervals.	 To	 calculate	 the	 confidence	 intervals	 we	 use	 tools	 that	 were	
introduced	in	Araar	(2006)	and	Araar	et	al.	(2009).24	More	formally,	we	test	the	following	
null	hypothesis	for	each	 ∈ ,	where	 	is	the	joint	support	of	the	two	distributions:	
	
																																																								
21	Moreover,	some	Danes	may	live	in	southern	Sweden	but	work	in	Denmark.	As	this	type	of	
migration	is	not	related	to	returns	to	skills	in	the	destination	country	this	should	decrease	the	estimated	
selection	to	Nordic	countries.	
22	Following	Leibbrandt	et	al.	(2005)	and	Fernandes‐Huertas	Moraga	(2011),	we	use	Silverman’s	
reference	bandwidth	multiplied	by	0.75	to	prevent	over‐smoothing.	The	same	bandwidth	is	used	also	in	all	
the	kernel	density	estimates	reported	in	subsequent	calculations.	
23	This	can	lead	to	difficulties	in	empirical	work,	and	less	restrictive	concepts	such	as	restricted	first	
order	stochastic	dominance	(Atkinson,	1987)	and	almost	stochastic	dominance	(Leshno	and	Levy,	2002)	have	
been	proposed.	
24		The	calculations	are	implemented	using	the	DASP	Stata	module	presented	in	Araar	and	Duclos	
(2013).	
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(1.17)	 	 H0:	w)	=	FN(w)	–	FM(w)	 	0,		
	
against	the	alternative	hypothesis	
	
(1.17)		 H1:	w)	=	FN(w)	–	FM(w)	 0	
	
and	characterize	any	relevant	range	of	 	where	we	are	able	to	reject	the	null.		
	
Let	 	be	 the	 standard	 deviation	 of	 the	 estimator	∆ ,	 and	 let	 z()	 be	 the	 (1	 –	 )th	
quantile	of	the	standard	normal	distribution.25	Davidson	and	Duclos	(2000)	show	that	the	
estimator	∆ 	is	consistent	and	asymptotically	normally	distributed.	We	can	 then	define	
the	lower	bound	for	a	one‐sided	confidence	interval	for	(w)	as:26	
	
(1.18)	 	 ∆ ∆ w .	
	
We	estimate	the	standard	errors	using	a	Taylor	linearization	and	allow	for	clustering	at	the	
individual	level.	We	then	implement	the	procedure	by	calculating	the	lower	bounds	of	the	
confidence	intervals	for	the	estimate	∆ w 	defined	in	equation	(1.18).	
	
Table	1.4	reports	the	relevant	ranges	where	the	 ∆ 	is	positive,	as	well	as	the	shares	
of	 migrants	 and	 non‐migrants	 whose	 earnings	 are	 outside	 the	 range.	 Consider	 first	 the	
distributions	 of	 non‐migrant	men	 and	men	migrating	 to	 destinations	 outside	 the	Nordic	
countries.	 Although	 it	 is	 not	 clearly	 visible	 from	 figure	 1.3a,	 table	 1.4	 shows	 that	 the	
cumulative	distribution	functions	cross	near	the	lower	tails	of	the	distributions.	Figure	1.5a	
depicts	∆ w 	and	 lower	 and	 upper	 bounds	 for	 a	 95%	 confidence	 interval.	 The	 lower	
bound	of	the	confidence	interval	is	positive	on	most	of	the	range	covering	the	supports	of	
the	distributions.		Only	1.3	percent	of	the	migrants	and	1.6	percent	of	the	non‐migrants	lie	
below	the	 lower	bound	of	 the	range	where	 the	 lower	bound	of	 the	confidence	 interval	 is	
positive.	 Put	 differently,	 earnings	 of	 over	 98	 percent	 of	 male	 migrants	 to	 destinations	
outside	Nordic	countries	are	on	the	range	where	 the	cumulative	distribution	 function	for	
non‐migrants	is	statistically	significantly	above	the	function	for	migrants.			
	
Figure	1.5b	depicts	∆ w 	and	the	bounds	for	a	95%	confidence	interval	for	non‐migrant	
women	and	women	migrating	to	destinations	outside	Nordic	countries.	Only	2.0	percent	of	
the	migrants	and	2.5	percent	of	the	non‐migrants	have	earnings	below	the	range	where	the	
lower	bound	of	the	confidence	interval	is	positive,	and	an	even	smaller	0.2	percent	of	the	
migrants	 and	 0.01	 percent	 of	 the	 non‐migrants	 have	 earnings	 above	 this	 range.	 	 We	
interpret	 these	 findings	as	support	 for	 the	stochastic	dominance	prediction	 for	both	men	
and	women	migrating	outside	Nordic	countries.	
	
																																																								
25	The	asymptotic	variance	of	∆ 	is	derived	in	Araar	et	al.	(2009).	
26	Chow	(1989)	proved	the	theorem	for	the	case	of	independent	samples.	Davidson	and	Duclos	
(2000)	show	that	the	results	also	extend	to	the	case	of	paired	incomes	from	the	same	population.	
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Figures	1.6a	and	1.6b	and	the	bottom	panel	of	table	1.4	present	a	corresponding	analysis	by	
comparing	the	cumulative	distributions	of	persons	who	migrate	to	other	Nordic	countries	
with	that	of	non‐migrants.	Almost	10	percent	of	male	migrants	and	12	percent	of	male	non‐
migrants	have	earnings	that	 lie	below	the	range	where	 ∆ 	is	positive,	and	another	0.9	
percent	of	the	migrants	and	0.5	percent	of	the	non‐migrants	have	earnings	above	the	range.	
Put	differently,	about	90	percent	of	the	male	migrants	to	Nordic	countries	have	incomes	on	
the	range	where	 ∆ 		is	positive.	For	women,	it	can	be	seen	in	Table	1.4	that	almost	97	
percent	 of	 the	 migrants	 going	 to	 Nordic	 countries	 have	 earnings	 on	 the	 range	 where	
∆ 	is	 positive.	 To	 sum	 up,	 the	 findings	 offer	 support	 to	 the	 stochastic	 dominance	
prediction	 for	 male	 and	 female	 migrants	 regardless	 of	 their	 destination,	 although	 the	
evidence	is	weaker	for	men	who	migrated	to	Nordic	countries.		
	
Additional	 support	 for	our	 theory	 comes	 from	Mexico.	Our	 theory	predicts	 that	 earnings	
distribution	 of	 migrants	 from	 Mexico	 to	 the	 United	 States	 should	 be	 stochastically	
dominated	 by	 the	 earnings	 distribution	 of	 non‐migrants.	 Fernández‐Huertas	 Moraga	
(2011)	 presents	 these	 distributions	 for	 men.	 Although	 he	 does	 not	 present	 confidence	
intervals	as	we	do,	 the	 figures	suggest	a	pattern	 that	mirrors	what	we	 find	 for	Denmark,	
reversing	 the	 curves	 for	migrants	 and	 non‐migrants.	 In	Mexico,	 the	wage	 distribution	 of	
non‐migrants	 stochastically	 dominates	 that	 of	migrants,	 apart	 from	an	 overlap	 for	 a	 few	
percent	at	the	bottom	and	converging	at	the	top.	
	
	
1.5	Selection	in	unobservable	characteristics		
	
In	the	previous	section,	we	documented	the	selection	that	characterizes	the	migrants	using	
the	 total	 pre‐migration	 earnings	 (after	 adjusting	 for	 age	 and	 year).	 We	 now	 examine	 a	
specific	component	of	earnings,	namely	the	component	due	to	unobserved	characteristics.	
In	 particular,	we	now	adjust	 for	 differences	 in	 educational	 attainment	 between	migrants	
and	non‐migrants	(as	well	as	other	observable	variables)	by	running	earnings	regressions,	
and	determine	whether	the	distribution	of	the	residuals	differs	between	the	two	groups.27	
	
By	construction,	the	residuals	from	a	Mincerian	wage	regression	reflect	the	part	of	earnings	
that	 is	uncorrelated	with	 the	observed	measures	of	 skill.	Obviously,	 the	decomposition	 is	
somewhat	arbitrary	because	it	depends	on	the	characteristics	that	are	observed	and	can	be	
included	as	regressors	in	the	wage	equation.	Nevertheless,	the	study	of	emigrant	selection	
in	terms	of	wage	residuals	is	important	for	a	number	of	reasons.	
	
First,	 selection	 in	 terms	of	unobservable	 characteristics	 sheds	 light	on	 the	 importance	of	
the	 quality	 of	 job	 matches	 relative	 to	 the	 skill	 component	 that	 is	 internationally	
transferable.	 The	 theory	 predicts	 that	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 selection	 in	 unobservable	
characteristics	depends	on	the	magnitude	of	the	correlation	coefficient	measuring	how	the	
source	and	destination	countries	value	 these	 types	of	 skills.	As	 long	as	 this	correlation	 is	
																																																								
27	In	the	earnings	regressions	we	use	non‐standardized	annual	earnings	as	the	dependent	variable.	
We	include	age	and	year	fixed	effects	and	run	the	regressions	separately	for	men	and	women.	
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strongly	 positive	 (so	 that	 unobserved	 characteristics	 are	 easily	 transferable	 across	
countries),	Danish	emigrants	would	be	positively	selected	 in	unobservables.	After	all,	 the	
payoff	to	these	types	of	skills	is	likely	to	be	greater	in	the	destination	countries.	However,	it	
could	be	argued	that	the	correlation	between	the	wage	residuals	 in	Denmark	and	abroad	
may	 be	 “small”.	 For	 example,	 the	 residuals	 from	 the	 wage	 regression	 may	 be	 largely	
reflecting	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 existing	 job	 match	 in	 the	 Danish	 labor	 market,	 rather	 than	
measuring	the	worker’s	innate	productivity.	To	the	extent	that	the	quality	of	the	job	match	
plays	an	 important	 role	 in	generating	 the	 residual,	 the	 correlation	 in	 this	 residual	 across	
countries	would	 be	 expected	 to	 be	weak	 (in	 fact,	 a	 pure	 random	matching	model	would	
suggest	that	it	would	be	zero).	As	a	result,	there	would	be	negative	selection	in	unobserved	
characteristics	 simply	 because	 Danish	 workers	 with	 good	 job	 matches	 (and	 hence	 high	
values	of	the	residual)	would	not	move.	
	
Second,	the	theory	also	suggests	that	the	nature	of	the	selection	in	pre‐migration	earnings	
depends	on	a	weighted	average	of	the	selection	that	occurs	in	observable	and	unobservable	
characteristics,	 with	 the	 weights	 being	 the	 fraction	 of	 earnings	 variance	 attributable	 to	
each	type	of	skill.	Because	observable	characteristics	play	only	a	limited	role	in	explaining	
the	variance	of	earnings	in	the	population,	it	is	crucial	to	precisely	delineate	the	nature	of	
selection	in	unobservable	characteristics.	
		
Table	 1.5	 reports	 the	Mincerian	wage	 regressions	 that	we	use	 to	 calculate	 the	 residuals.	
The	sample	includes	the	whole	population	of	prime	aged	full	time	workers	pooled	over	the	
entire	1995‐2004	period.	In	addition	to	vectors	of	fixed	effects	giving	the	worker’s	age	and	
educational	attainment,	we	also	include	the	worker’s	marital	status	and	number	of	children.	
The	regressions	are	estimated	separately	for	men	and	women.		
	
Figure	1.7a	presents	 the	 cumulative	distributions	of	wage	 residuals	 for	male	migrants	 to	
Nordic	 countries,	male	migrants	 to	destinations	outside	Nordic	 countries,	 and	male	non‐
migrants.	 The	 values	 of	 the	 residuals	 are	 truncated	 at	 ‐2	 and	 2,	 a	 range	 that	 covers	
practically	 all	 of	 the	 population.	 The	 cumulative	 distribution	 function	 of	 residuals	 for	
emigrants	who	moved	outside	the	Nordic	countries	is	located	to	the	right	of	the	cumulative	
distribution	 for	migrants	 to	Nordic	 countries,	which	 in	 turn	 is	 located	 to	 the	 right	of	 the	
cumulative	 distribution	 of	 the	 non‐migrants.	 The	 visual	 evidence,	 therefore,	 provides	 a	
strong	 indication	 that	 migrants	 are	 positively	 selected	 in	 terms	 of	 unobserved	
characteristics.	Figure	1.7b	presents	the	analogous	evidence	for	women.	The	figure	shows	
that	 female	migrants	 are	 also	 positively	 selected	 in	 terms	 of	wage	 residuals.	 As	was	 the	
case	when	comparing	 the	measure	of	pre‐migration	earnings	 in	 the	previous	section,	 the	
selection	 in	unobserved	characteristics	 is	 less	pronounced	 for	women	 than	 for	men.	One	
explanation	for	this	could	be	that	men	are	typically	primary	earners	in	couples.		
		
We	 also	 performed	Kolmogorov‐Smirnov	 tests	 on	 the	 distributions	 of	 residuals	 for	 non‐
migrants	 and	migrants	 to	 other	Nordic	 countries	 and	 for	migrants	 to	 other	 destinations	
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(separately	 for	 men	 and	 women).	 All	 the	 tests	 clearly	 rejected	 the	 null	 hypothesis,	
confirming	that	the	distributions	of	residuals	indeed	differ	among	the	groups.28	
	
The	evidence	on	the	positive	selection	of	migrants	in	unobserved	characteristics	obviously	
implies	 that	 the	 selection	 in	 pre‐migration	 earnings	 documented	 in	 the	 previous	 section	
cannot	be	attributed	 solely	 to	 the	 fact	 that	migrants	are	more	 educated.	 Instead,	we	 find	
that	there	is	positive	selection	within	education	groups.	This	result	also	has	implications	on	
interpretation	 of	 earnings	 regression	 residuals	 in	 general.	 The	 residuals	 from	 wage	
regressions	are	sometimes	interpreted	as	reflecting	the	value	of	the	job	match	between	the	
worker	and	 the	employer.	 If	 a	high	value	 for	 the	 residual	only	 reflects	a	 good	match,	we	
would	then	expect	to	find	that	workers	with	large	residuals	would	be	less	likely	to	change	
jobs	and	less	prone	to	migrate.	Our	findings	clearly	reject	this	 interpretation.	 	Comparing	
results	on	 the	 self‐selection	 to	other	Nordic	 countries	 and	 the	 rest	of	 the	world	 suggests	
that	search	for	a	better	job	match	to	those	who	have	a	bad	job	match	in	Denmark	is	more	
pronounced	among	migrants	to	other	Nordic	countries.29	
	
As	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 we	 also	 calculated	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 cumulative	
distribution	functions	with	confidence	intervals	to	determine	whether	empirical	evidence	
supports	the	stochastic	dominance	prediction.	The	test	results	are	summarized	in	Table	1.6	
Figure	1.8a	depicts	∆ w 	and	the	lower	and	upper	bounds	for	a	95%	confidence	interval	
for	the	comparison	between	non‐migrant	men	and	men	migrating	to	destinations	outside	
Nordic	countries.	The	lower	bound	of	the	95%	confidence	interval	is	positive	on	the	range	
of	 residuals	 covering	 most	 of	 the	 support	 of	 the	 two	 distributions.	 And	 the	 cumulative	
distribution	function	cross	only	ion	the	lower	tails	of	the	distributions.		Although	we	cannot	
conclusively	 reject	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 of	 no	 stochastic	 dominance	 (because	 the	
distribution	functions	cross	in	the	tails),	only	5.6	percent	of	the	migrants	and	6.2	percent	of	
the	non‐migrants	have	wage	residuals	below	the	lower	bound	of	this	range.	In	short,	there	
is	strong	evidence	of	stochastic	dominance	for	the	vast	majority	of	male	migrants.30		
	
Figure	1.	9a	depicts	∆ w 	and	the	bounds	for	a	95%	confidence	interval	for	non‐migrant	
men	and	men	migrating	to	other	Nordic	countries.	A	12	percent	share	of	migrants	and	14	
percent	of	non‐migrants	have	values	of	the	wage	residual	that	are	below	the	lower	bound	
of	 the	 range	 where	 the	 lower	 bound	 of	 the	 95%	 confidence	 interval	 is	 positive,	 and	 an	
additional	1	percent	or	so	of	both	groups	have	values	of	the	residual	that	would	place	them	
																																																								
	 28	The	p‐value	for	the	test	between	women	migrating	to	other	Nordic	countries	and	to	other	
destinations	was	0.015	and	all	the	other	p‐values	were	0.000,	so	that	all	tests	clearly	reject	the	hypothesis	
that	the	observations	are	drawn	from	the	same	distribution.	
29	For	this	group,	returns	to	unobserved	productivity	is	not	as	important	criterion	for	self‐selection	
as	among	migrants	to	the	rest	of	the	world,	as	differences	in	returns	to	skills	between	Denmark	and	other	
Nordic	countries	are	minor.	As	a	result,	the	mechanism	of	searching	for	a	better	match	quality	is	more	
pronounced.	
30	For	women,	12	percent	of	migrants	and	14	percent	of	non‐migrants	have	earnings	residuals	below	
the	lower	bound	of	the	range	where	the	lower	bound	of	the	confidence	interval	is	positive,	and	shares	of	
migrants	and	non‐migrants	above	the	range	are	less	than	less	than	one	percent.	
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above	 this	 range.	 Put	 differently,	 we	 find	 statistically	 significant	 evidence	 of	 stochastic	
dominance	 in	 unobserved	 characteristics	 in	 the	 range	 of	 the	 distribution	 that	 includes	
around	86	percent	of	all	observations.31	Interestingly,	there	is	an	area	in	the	left	tail	of	the	
distribution	of	residuals	where	the	upper	bound	of	the	confidence	interval	is	negative.	An	
8	%	share	of	migrants	and	6	%	share	of	non‐migrants	have	residuals	in	this	area,	and	the	
interpretation	 would	 be	 that	 male	 migrants	 to	 other	 Nordic	 countries	 are	 negatively	
selected	in	terms	of	residuals	in	the	left	tail	of	the	distribution.	
	
We	conclude	by	summarizing	the	evidence	as	follows:	there	is	strong	positive	selection	in	
unobservable	 characteristics	 in	 the	 sample	 of	 migrants	 that	 moved	 outside	 the	 Nordic	
countries	and	weaker	evidence	of	positive	selection	in	the	sample	of	migrants	who	moved	
to	other	Nordic	countries.	
	
	
1.6	Bias	in	counterfactual	predictions	
	
The	 fact	 that	 emigrants	 are	 self‐selected	 in	 their	 unobserved	 characteristics	 implies	 that	
using	 the	 observable	 characteristics	 of	migrants	 to	 predict	 their	 counterfactual	 earnings	
had	they	chosen	not	to	migrate	will	 lead	to	biased	results.	Due	to	data	constraints,	this	is	
precisely	the	empirical	exercise	conducted	by	Chiquiar	and	Hanson	(2005),who	adopt	the	
methodology	 introduced	 by	 DiNardo,	 Fortin,	 and	 Lemieux	 (1996)	 and	 build	 a	
counterfactual	wage	density	of	what	the	Mexican	immigrants	would	have	earned	in	Mexico	
had	 they	 stayed.	 The	 actual	 wage	 density	 of	 Mexican	 “stayers”	 is	 then	 compared	 to	 the	
counterfactual	 density	 for	 migrants.	 By	 construction,	 this	 approach	 ignores	 the	 role	 of	
unobservable	characteristics	in	the	estimation	of	the	counterfactual	wage	distribution.	
	
A	 clear	 advantage	 of	 the	 Danish	 register	 data	 is	 that	 the	 earnings	 of	 emigrants	 can	 be	
observed	before	they	emigrate,	so	there	 is	no	need	to	build	a	counterfactual	density.	One	
just	needs	to	compare	the	earnings	distribution	of	non‐migrants	to	the	actual	distribution	
of	future	migrants,	as	we	have	done	in	the	preceding	analysis.	The	register	data	allows	us	to	
precisely	 measure	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 bias	 resulting	 from	 carrying	 out	 a	 counterfactual	
exercise	 as	 in	 Chiquiar	 and	 Hanson	 (2005).	 In	 particular,	 we	 can	 contrast	 the	 predicted	
counterfactual	 wage	 distribution	 of	 migrants	 had	 they	 not	 moved	 to	 the	 actual	 wage	
distribution	 of	 migrants	 prior	 to	 their	 move.	 We	 carry	 out	 this	 exercise	 by	 precisely	
replicating	the	various	steps	in	the	Chiquiar‐Hanson	calculations.	It	 is	worth	emphasizing	
that	this	type	of	bias	will	arise	not	only	in	studies	that	examine	the	selection	of	migrants,	
but	in	any	study	that	relies	on	observables	to	predict	a	counterfactual	wage	distribution.		
	
Let	 	represent	 the	 logarithm	 of	 standardized	 annual	 earnings	 as	 defined	 earlier	 (i.e.	
earnings	adjusted	for	age,	gender,	and	year	effects).	Let	 | 	be	the	density	function	of	
wages	 in	 Denmark,	 conditional	 on	 a	 set	 of	 observable	 characteristics	 .	 Also,	 let	 	be	 an	
																																																								
31	For	women,	14	percent	of	migrants	and	17	percent	of	non‐migrants	have	earnings	residuals	below	
the	lower	bound	of	the	range	where	the	lower	bound	of	the	confidence	interval	is	positive,	and	shares	of	
migrants	and	non‐migrants	above	the	range	are	less	than	less	than	four	percent	and	two	percent.	
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indicator	variable	equal	 to	one	 if	 the	 individual	migrates	 the	 following	year	and	equal	 to	
zero	 otherwise.	 Define	 further	 | 0 	as	 the	 conditional	 density	 of	 observed	
characteristics	among	workers	 in	Denmark	who	choose	not	to	migrate,	and	 | 1 	be	
the	corresponding	conditional	density	among	migrants.	The	observed	wage	density	for	the	
non‐migrants	is	
	
(1.19)	 	 | 0 | , 0 | 0 .	
	
Similarly,	the	observed	density	for	the	migrants	is	
	
(1.20)	 	 | 1 | , 1 | 1 .	
	
Up	 to	 this	 point,	 the	 analysis	 reported	 in	 this	 paper	 consists	 of	 directly	 estimating	 and	
comparing	 the	 distribution	 functions	 associated	 with	 the	 densities	 in	 (1.19)	 and	 (1.20).	
Suppose	that	the	pre‐migration	earnings	density	for	non‐migrants	were	not	available.	We	
would	 instead	attempt	 to	estimate	 it	 from	the	observable	characteristics	of	 the	migrants.	
The	implied	counterfactual	distribution	is:	
	
(1.21)	 	 | 1 | , 0 | 1 .	
	
Equation	 (1.21)	 corresponds	 to	 the	density	 of	 income	 for	 non‐migrants,	 but	 it	 is	 instead	
integrated	 over	 the	 density	 of	 observable	 characteristics	 for	 migrants.	 Note	 that	 the	
counterfactual	density	in	(21)	can	be	rewritten	as:	
	
(1.22)	 	 	
| 1 | , 0 | 0
| 1
| 0
	
	 	 	 	 	
		 	 	 | , 0 | 0 ,	
	 	
where		
|
|
	.	To	compute	 ,	we	use	Bayes’	law	to	write:	
	
(1.23)	 	
|
	 |
		and		
|
	 |
,	
	
where	 	is	the	unconditional	density	of	observed	characteristics.		
	
We	can	then	combine	these	two	equations	to	solve	for	:	
	
(1.24)	 	 	
1|
1 1|
	
0
1
.	
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The	proportion	Pr(I	=	0)/Pr(I	=	1)	is	a	constant	related	to	the	proportion	of	migrants	in	the	
data.	It	can	be	set	to	one	in	Kernel	density	estimation	without	loss	of	generality.	The	weight	
we	use	in	the	estimation	is	then	given	by:	
	
(1.25)	 	 	
1|
1 1|
.	
	
	
As	in	Chiquiar	and	Hanson	(2005),	the	individual	weights	e	are	calculated	by	estimating	a	
logit	model	where	the	dependent	variable	indicates	if	a	person	emigrated.	The	regressors	
include	a	vector	of	age	fixed	effects,	a	vector	of	schooling	fixed	effects,	variables	indicating	
whether	 the	worker	 is	married	and	 the	number	of	 children	 (and	an	 interaction	between	
these	 two	 variables),	 and	 a	 vector	 of	 year	 fixed	 effects.32	Table	 1.7	 reports	 the	 logit	
regressions	estimated	separately	by	gender.	The	coefficients	are	then	used	to	compute	the	
weights	for	each	non‐migrant	person	in	the	sample.33	Figures	1.10a	and	1.10b	present	the	
resulting	counterfactual	density	functions	of	the	logarithm	of	standardized	earnings	as	well	
as	the	actual	distributions	for	migrants	and	non‐migrants.34	
	
The	difference	between	the	actual	density	for	non‐migrants	and	the	counterfactual	density	
for	 migrants	 reflects	 the	 part	 of	 self‐selection	 that	 is	 due	 to	 observable	 characteristics.	
Similarly,	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 counterfactual	 and	 actual	 densities	 for	 migrants	
reflects	 the	 part	 of	 selection	 that	 is	 due	 to	 unobserved	 characteristics	 (i.e.,	 all	 those	
variables	that	could	not	be	included	in	the	logit	model).	
	
A	simple	way	of	quantifying	these	distributional	differences	is	to	compute	the	averages	of	
the	various	distributions.	These	calculations	are	reported	in	Table	1.8.	Consider	initially	the	
results	in	the	male	sample.	The	difference	between	the	mean	of	the	actual	distributions	for	
migrants	 and	 non‐migrants	 is	 0.245	 log	 points,	 but	 the	 difference	 between	 the	
counterfactual	distribution	and	the	distribution	for	non‐migrants	is	0.073.	This	implies	that	
only	about	30	percent	of	the	positive	selection	in	pre‐migration	earnings	can	be	attributed	
to	 the	 observable	 characteristics	 included	 in	 the	 logit	 model,	 while	 about	 70	 percent	 is	
attributable	to	unobservable	determinants	of	productivity.	
	
The	 calculations	 in	 the	 female	 sample	 yield	 a	 difference	of	 0.157	 log	points	between	 the	
means	of	the	actual	distributions	for	migrants	and	non‐migrants	and	a	difference	of	0.074	
points	between	the	counterfactual	distribution	and	the	distribution	for	non‐migrants.	As	a	
result,	 observable	 and	 unobservable	 characteristics	 each	 account	 for	 about	 half	 of	 the	
																																																								
32	We	also	tried	specifications	with	age,	age	squared	and	interactions	of	explanatory	variables,	but	
we	do	not	report	these	analyses	as	the	resulting	counterfactual	distributions	did	not	practically	differ	from	
the	distributions	resulting	from	this	simpler	specification.		
33	As	earlier,	we	use	Silverman’s	reference	bandwidth	multiplied	by	0.75.	
34	To	conduct	the	counterfactual	analysis	we	pool	the	sample	of	all	migrants	(regardless	of	whether	
they	moved	to	Nordic	countries	or	not).	
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positive	 self‐selection	 in	 the	pre‐migration	 earnings	of	women.35	The	 key	 lesson	 is	 clear:	
Selection	 in	 unobservable	 characteristics	 plays	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 determining	 the	 skill	
composition	of	emigrants.	
	
The	distinct	role	of	observables	and	unobservables	in	determining	the	selection	in	the	pre‐
migration	earnings	of	migrants	is	evident	if	we	return	to	the	Roy	model	and	the	equation	
(1.16)	presenting	the	conditional	expectation	E(log	w0	|	v*	>	*).		
	
Equation	(1.16)	yields	an	 interesting	and	potentially	 important	 insight.	The	nature	of	 the	
selection	 in	 pre‐migration	 earnings,	 of	 course,	 is	 given	 by	 the	 sum	 of	 the	 selection	 in	
observables	and	the	selection	in	unobservables.	Note,	however,	that	each	of	these	selection	
terms	has	a	weighting	coefficient	 that	 represents	 the	variance	 in	earnings	attributable	 to	
observable	characteristics	( 2 20 0r  )	or	to	unobservable	characteristics	(0
2 ).	As	noted	earlier,	
observable	characteristics	explain	a	relatively	small	fraction	of	the	variance	in	earnings.	Put	
differently,	equation	(1.7)	implies	that	it	is	the	selection	in	unobservables	that	is	most	likely	
to	determine	the	nature	of	the	selection	that	characterizes	the	emigrant	sample.	
	
To	the	extent	that	both	types	of	selections	(i.e.,	in	observables	and	unobservables)	work	in	
the	 same	 direction,	 the	 counterfactual	 exercise	 described	 in	 this	 section	 will	 inevitably	
underestimate	the	true	extent	of	positive	selection	in	pre‐migration	earnings.	Conversely,	
the	 counterfactual	 exercise	 will	 also	 attenuate	 the	 extent	 of	 “true”	 negative	 selection	 if	
there	is	negative	selection	in	both	components	of	skills.	In	fact,	Fernández‐Huertas	Moraga	
(2011)	 presents	 a	 corresponding	 analysis	 using	 survey	 data	 from	Mexico	 and	 finds	 that	
counterfactual	estimates	greatly	underestimate	the	extent	of	negative	selection	in	the	pre‐
migration	 earnings	 of	 Mexicans	 who	 move	 to	 the	 United	 States.	 Put	 differently,	 the	
counterfactual	exercise	may	lead	to	qualitatively	right	conclusions	about	the	nature	of	the	
selection,	but	it	may	also	generate	a	sizable	bias,	greatly	underestimating	the	true	extent	of	
selection.		
	
	
1.7	Selection	and	immigration	restrictions	
	
As	 applied	 in	 the	 immigration	 literature,	 the	 Roy	model	 focuses	 solely	 on	 the	 economic	
factors	 that	 motivate	 labor	 flows	 across	 international	 borders.	 The	 modeling	 typically	
ignores	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 flows	occur	within	 a	 policy	 framework	where	 some	 receiving	
countries	 enact	 detailed	 restrictions	 specifying	 which	 potential	 migrants	 are	 admissible	
and	which	are	not.	
	
We	 can	 use	 the	 register	 data	 from	 Denmark,	 combined	 with	 the	 unique	 political	
circumstances	 that	 guarantee	 free	 migration	 within	 Europe,	 to	 partially	 address	 the	
																																																								
35	The	component	of	self‐selection	that	is	due	to	unobservable	characteristics	plays	a	somewhat	
smaller	role	for	women.	One	reason	could	be	that	women	are	more	often	tied	migrants,	and	the	migration	
decision	may	be	mainly	based	on	the	skills	of	the	spouse.	The	variance	in	income	is	also	smaller	for	women,	
which	also	makes	the	selection	both	in	terms	of	observable	and	unobservable	characteristics	weaker.		
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question	of	whether	immigration	policy	affects	selection	all	that	much.	Specifically,	we	can	
subdivide	 the	 group	 of	 migrants	 who	moved	 outside	 Nordic	 countries	 into	 two	 groups:	
those	who	moved	to	a	country	 in	the	EU15	or	to	Switzerland,	and	those	who	moved	to	a	
country	 outside	 the	 EU15	 and	 Switzerland.	 Movement	 of	 labor	 was	 unrestricted	 within	
Denmark	and	EU15	countries	and	Switzerland	in	the	period	under	study,	but	was	obviously	
restricted	by	immigration	regulations	to	destinations	outside	the	EU15,	such	as	the	United	
States.	
	
It	turns	out	that	these	different	immigration	policies	pursued	by	the	EU15	and	Switzerland	
and	the	rest	of	the	world	barely	matter	in	determining	the	selection	of	Danish	emigrants.	
Figure	11.1a	depicts	the	cumulative	distribution	functions	of	the	logarithm	of	standardized	
annual	 income	 for	 men	 and	 figure	 1.11b	 for	 women.	 It	 is	 evident	 that	 the	 distribution	
functions	of	standardized	earnings	are	very	similar	for	the	two	groups	of	migrants.	We	also	
conducted	 the	 analysis	 using	 the	 wage	 residuals	 (not	 shown),	 and	 the	 distributions	 of	
residuals	are	also	similar	between	the	two	groups.	
	
There	 is	 an	 important	 sense	 in	 which	 these	 policy	 restrictions	 cannot	 matter	 much.	
Suppose,	for	example,	that	a	receiving	country	enacts	a	policy	that	limits	entry	only	to	high‐
skill	immigrants.	If	the	high‐skill	immigrants	from	a	sending	country	do	not	find	it	optimal	
to	move,	the	policy	cannot	force	those	high‐skill	workers	to	migrate.	All	the	policy	can	do	is	
essentially	cut	the	migration	flow	from	that	particular	sending	country	down	to	zero.	The	
low‐skill	workers	would	like	to	move	but	are	not	admitted,	and	the	high	skill	workers	are	
admissible	but	they	do	not	want	to	move.	
	
In	sum,	the	positive	self‐selection	that	is	so	evident	in	the	Danish	emigrant	data	cannot	be	
explained	 by	 the	 possibility	 that	 migration	 costs	 or	 immigration	 restrictions	 differ	 by	
destination.	 Even	 though	 labor	 flows	 to	 the	 EU15	were	 unrestricted	 and	were	 probably	
relatively	cheap	for	Danish	emigrants,	there	is	no	evidence	of	weaker	positive	selection	to	
the	European	Union	sphere	during	the	period	under	study.		
	
 
1.8	Conclusion	
 
This	article	shows	that	the	Roy	model	has	more	dramatic	predictions	on	the	self‐selection	
of	emigrants	than	previously	realized.	The	same	conditions	that	have	been	shown	to	result	
in	emigrants	being	positively	(negatively)	self‐selected	in	terms	of	their	average	earnings	
actually	 imply	 that	 the	 earnings	 distribution	 of	 emigrants	 first‐order	 stochastically	
dominates	(or	is	first‐order	stochastically	dominated	by)	the	earnings	distribution	of	non‐
migrants.		Our	theoretical	analysis	also	distinguishes	between	selection	in	observable	and	
selection	in	unobservable	characteristics.	
	
Our	 empirical	 analysis	 uses	 the	 Danish	 full	 population	 register	 data	 to	 analyze	 the	 self‐
selection	of	emigrants,	in	terms	of	education,	earnings	and	unobservable	ability,	measured	
by	residuals	from	Mincerian	earnings	regressions.	The	results	are	in	line	with	the	theory;	
the	migrants	are	better	educated	and	both	pre‐emigration	earnings	and	wage	 regression	
residuals	 of	 migrants	 stochastically	 dominate	 those	 of	 non‐migrants	 over	 most	 of	 the	
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support	of	the	distributions.	Consider,	for	example,	the	case	of	full‐time	workers	aged	25‐
54.	For	98	percent	of	both	men	and	women	who	migrate	outside	other	Nordic	countries	the	
cumulative	 earnings	 distribution	 in	 the	 year	 before	 emigration	 stochastically	 dominates	
that	 of	 non‐migrants	 with	 a	 95%	 confidence	 interval.	 The	 difference	 between	 the	
cumulative	distributions	is	not	statistically	significantly	different	in	either	direction	for	the	
remaining	2	percent.	
	
Decomposing	 the	 self‐selection	 in	 total	 earnings	 into	 self‐selection	 in	 observable	
characteristics	and	self‐selection	in	unobservable	characteristics	(as	measured	by	residuals	
from	Mincerian	wage	regressions),	reveals	that	unobserved	abilities	play	a	dominant	role.	
For	 men,	 about	 70	 percent	 of	 the	 positive	 self‐selection	 in	 pre‐migration	 earnings	 is	
attributable	 to	 unobservable	 determinants	 of	 productivity.	 For	 women,	 the	 fraction	 is	
about	 50	 percent.	 This	 suggests	 that	 relying	 on	 counterfactual	 distributions,	 based	 on	
observed	characteristics,	would	strongly	underestimate	positive	self‐selection.	This	result	
complements	the	Fernández‐Huertas	Moraga	(2011)	finding	that	counterfactual	estimates	
also	greatly	underestimate	the	extent	of	negative	selection	in	the	pre‐migration	earnings	of	
Mexicans	 who	 move	 to	 the	 United	 States.	 In	 short,	 the	 use	 of	 counterfactual	 earnings	
distributions	 based	 on	 observable	 characteristics	 greatly	 understate	 the	 true	 extent	 of	
selection	 in	 total	 earnings.	 Strong	 positive	 self‐selection	 in	 residuals	 also	 suggests	 that	
unobserved	abilities	play	a	much	bigger	role	in	migration	decisions	than	match	quality.	
	
Our	findings	also	have	implications	for	immigration	policies.	Receiving	countries	can	only	
base	 their	 admission	 policies	 on	 skill	 variables	 that	 are	 observed,	 whereas	much	 of	 the	
selection	of	immigrants	is	“hidden”	in	their	unobserved	characteristics.	It	can	be	expected	
that	 migrants	 will	 be	 self‐selected	 in	 terms	 of	 unobserved	 characteristics	 even	 when	
admission	restrictions	are	applied,	and	the	self‐selection	among	those	fulfilling	admission	
criteria	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 reflect	 relative	 skill	 prices.	 This	 raises	 a	 question	 about	 the	
effectiveness	of	point	systems	that	are	necessarily	based	on	observable	characteristics.	The	
importance	 of	 relative	 skill	 prices	 is	 also	 supported	 by	 our	 separate	 analyses	 of	 self‐
selection	of	Danes	migrating	to	the	countries	belonging	to	common	European	labor	market	
(excluding	other	Nordic	countries	that	have	skill	prices	similar	to	Denmark)	and	not	having	
any	 immigration	 restrictions,	 and	 the	 self‐selection	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 world.	 There	 is	
virtually	no	difference	in	the	self‐selection	to	these	destination	areas,	the	main	difference	
being	that	men	to	other	European	countries	are	slightly	more	strongly	self‐selected	at	the	
upper	 parts	 of	 the	 skill	 distribution.	 If	 immigration	 restrictions	were	 to	 have	 played	 an	
important	 role	 in	 determining	 the	 skill	 composition	 of	 the	 immigrant	 flow,	 the	 opposite	
should	have	been	the	case.	
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Chapter 2.  
Preferences for Redistribution among Emigrants from a Welfare State 
	 	 This	chapter	is	based	on	joint	work	with	Panu	Poutvaara	
	
	
2.1	Introduction	
	
Economists	 usually	 assume	 that	 international	 migration	 is	 motivated	 by	 earnings	
differentials	across	countries.	Economic	analysis	of	internal	migration	dates	back	at	least	to	
1776.	 In	An	Inquiry	into	the	Nature	and	Causes	of	the	Wealth	of	Nations,	Adam	Smith	notes	
that	the	wage	differences	in	the	United	Kingdom	were	much	larger	than	price	differences,	
concluding	that	“it	appears	evidently	from	experience	that	a	man	is	of	all	sorts	of	luggage	
the	 most	 difficult	 to	 be	 transported.”	 Subsequently,	 Hicks	 (1932)	 concluded	 that	 the	
differences	 in	 economic	 advantages	 are	 the	 main	 causes	 for	 migration.	 Sjaastad	 (1962)	
made	a	connection	between	migration	and	 investment	 in	human	capital,	arguing	that	 the	
prospective	migrant	should	choose	the	destination	that	maximizes	the	net	present	value	of	
lifetime	earnings,	net	of	the	migration	costs.	Tiebout	(1956)	argued	that	if	there	are	many	
jurisdictions	and	migration	is	costless,	migrants	tend	to	sort	into	jurisdictions	that	provide	
their	preferred	mix	of	public	goods.	This	Tiebout	equilibrium	is	derived	under	a	number	of	
restrictive	assumptions,	including	that	the	governments	can	levy	lump‐sum	taxes	to	finance	
public	 goods	 and	 that	 there	 are	 no	 economies	 of	 scale	 or	 mobility	 costs.	 In	 a	 Tiebout	
framework,	net	 contributors	 to	 redistribution	could	always	emigrate	 to	 jurisdictions	 that	
do	not	redistribute	income.	
	
In	a	seminal	contribution,	Borjas’	(1987)	analyzed	the	effect	of	cross‐country	differences	in	
income	distribution	on	the	self‐selection	and	earnings	of	immigrants.	His	main	thesis	was	
that	 immigrants	 to	 the	 United	 States	 tend	 to	 come	 from	 the	 upper	 end	 of	 the	 income	
distribution	 if	 there	 is	 sufficiently	 high	 correlation	 between	 individual	 earnings	 in	 the	
country	of	origin	and	expected	earnings	in	the	United	States,	in	case	of	migrating	there,	and	
if	 the	 country	 of	 origin	 has	 more	 equal	 income	 distribution	 than	 the	 United	 States.	
Subsequently,	 Dahl	 (2002)	 has	 analyzed	 self‐selected	migration	 inside	 the	 United	 States	
and	Chiquiar	and	Hanson	(2005)	migration	from	Mexico	to	the	United	States.	
	
Denmark	 and	 other	 Scandinavian	 welfare	 states	 have	 relatively	 high	 taxes,	 generous	
welfare	 services	 and	 small	 income	 differences.	 Borjas	 (1987)	 hypothesis	 predicts	 that	
Danes	with	high	earnings	capability	should	be	more	likely	to	migrate	to	rich	countries	with	
lower	taxes	and	wider	income	distribution,	like	the	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom.	
This	 suggests	 that	 emigration	decisions	 and	preferences	 for	 redistribution	might	 also	 be	
related.	 High‐earners	 have	 self‐interest	 to	 oppose	 redistribution,	 and	 to	 choose	 less	
redistributive	countries.	
	
The	 causality	 could	 also	 go	 the	 other	 way.	 Besides	 wider	 income	 differences	 than	 in	
European	welfare	states,	the	United	States	also	has	a	culture	that	is	more	oriented	towards	
risk‐taking	 and	 personal	 responsibility	 (Alesina	 and	Angeletos	 2005;	 Piketty	 1995).	 This	
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may	attract	high‐achievers,	independently	of	their	attitude	towards	redistribution.	It	could	
be	 that	having	 lived	 in	 the	United	States	 results,	 on	average,	 in	more	American	attitudes	
towards	 redistribution.	Or	 the	 other	way	 round:	Danes	 living	 in	 the	United	 States	might	
become	more	leftist	if	they	find	the	income	differences	unfair.	
	
In	this	paper,	we	analyze	the	attitudes	of	Danish	emigrants	towards	income	redistribution	
and	 the	 determinants	 of	 individual	 success,	 and	 compare	 this	 to	 the	 attitudes	 of	 Danes	
living	 in	Denmark,	measured	 in	 the	European	Social	Survey	(ESS).	We	use	unique	survey	
data	on	Danes	who	had	emigrated	in	selected	years	between	1987	and	2002	and	had	not	
returned	 to	 Denmark	 by	 2007.	 The	 surveys	 were	 planned	 by	 Martin	 D.	 Munk	 (Aalborg	
University’s	 Copenhagen	 campus)	 and	 Poutvaara	 within	 the	 project	 “Danes	 Abroad:	
Economic	 and	 Social	Motivations	 for	 Emigration	 and	 Return	Migration”,	 financed	 by	 the	
Danish	 Social	 Science	 Research	 Council.	 The	 survey	 was	 implemented	 by	 Statistics	
Denmark,	 with	 the	 help	 of	 register	 data.	 It	 asked	 respondents	 to	 state	 their	 attitudes	
towards	 income	 redistribution	 and	 the	 determinants	 of	 individual	 success.	We	 study	 to	
what	 extent	 gender,	 age,	 education,	 and	 family	 situation	 explain	 attitudes	 towards	
redistribution	in	Denmark	and	among	Danes	abroad.	We	also	study	how	attitudes	towards	
redistribution	 differ	 among	 Danes	 who	 migrated	 to	 other	 Nordic	 countries,	 the	 United	
States,	 other	 English‐speaking	 countries,	 the	 rest	 of	Western	 Europe	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
world,	and	whether	such	differences	are	robust	to	adding	socioeconomic	and	demographic	
controls,	opinions	about	the	determinants	of	individual	success,	and	generalized	trust.	
	
There	is	a	body	of	both	theoretical	and	empirical	economic	literature	on	how	preferences	
for	 redistribution	 are	 formed.	 The	 standard	 theoretical	 approach	 is	 to	 assume	 that	
individual	preferences	for	redistribution	are	determined	by	whether	the	individual	would	
gain	or	 lose	 from	 it,	 following	 the	 seminal	 contribution	by	Meltzer	 and	Richards	 (1981).	
The	static	model	was	extended	by	Benabou	and	Ok	(2001),	whose	dynamic	model	allows	
for	social	mobility.	Whereas	in	the	former	model	individuals	only	care	about	their	current	
income,	they	also	take	their	future	income	into	account	in	the	latter.	
		
A	 further	 extension	 is	 to	 assume	 that	 individuals	 do	 not	 only	 care	 about	 their	 own	
consumption,	but	that	there	is	some	measure	of	income	distribution	as	an	argument	in	the	
utility	 function.	 Alesina	 and	 Giuliano	 (2011)	 distinguish	 between	 two	 cases.	 First,	 some	
measure	 of	 income	 distribution	 can	 be	 in	 the	 utility	 function	 indirectly.	 In	 this	 case	
individuals	 do	 not	 care	 about	 inequality	 per	 se	 but	 only	 about	 its	 effect	 on	 one’s	 own	
consumption.	 Externalities	 in	 education	 and	 crime	 have	 been	 proposed	 as	 channels	
through	 which	 people	 in	 the	 upper	 end	 of	 the	 income	 distribution	 could	 be	 negatively	
affected	by	inequality.	Additionally,	it	can	be	argued	that	more	inequality	creates	incentives	
to	 exercise	 more	 effort,	 and	 this	 can	 work	 in	 favour	 of	 society	 as	 a	 whole.	 Second,	 a	
measure	 of	 income	 distribution	 can	 be	 in	 the	 utility	 function	 directly.	 In	 this	 case,	
individuals	have	preferences	on	distribution	of	income	per	se	instead	of	caring	only	about	
how	it	affects	their	own	consumption.	
	
People	 can	 make	 a	 distinction	 between	 income	 that	 is	 acquired	 by	 luck	 and	 income	
acquired	 by	 own	 work	 and	 effort,	 and	 this	 distinction	 can	 be	 related	 to	 preferences	 of	
redistribution	 of	 income	 (Alesina	 and	 Angeletos	 2005).	 Using	 survey	 data,	 Fong	 (2001)	
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finds	 that	 preferences	 for	 redistribution	 are	 indeed	 strongly	 correlated	 with	 individual	
beliefs	about	the	extent	to	which	individuals	have	control	over	their	material	well‐being.	It	
has	 also	 been	 found	 that	 preferences	 for	 redistribution	 vary	 across	 countries	 in	 a	
systematic	 way.	 People	 in	 European	 countries	 tend	 to	 prefer	 more	 redistribution	 than	
those	 in	 the	United	States	 (Alesina	et.	al.	2001,	Alesina	and	Glaeser	2004),	and	people	 in	
former	 socialist	 countries	 prefer	 more	 redistribution	 than	 those	 in	 Western	 countries	
(Corneo	and	Grüner	2002).	This	finding	suggests	that	there	might	be	an	important	cultural	
component	in	preferences	for	redistribution	(Corneo	2001,	Alesina	and	Glaeser	2004).	
	
Studying	the	determinants	of	preferences	for	redistribution	among	immigrants	has	been	a	
way	to	separate	the	effect	of	culture	from	the	economic	and	institutional	context	(Alesina	
and	Giuliano	2011,	Luttmer	and	Singhal	2011).	Using	survey	evidence	Luttmer	and	Singhal	
(2011)	 found	 a	 strong	 and	 positive	 relationship	 between	 immigrants’	 redistributive	
preferences	 and	 the	 preference	 in	 the	 country	 of	 origin.	 The	 effect	 is	 robust	 to	 a	 set	 of	
controls	and	persists	 into	 the	second	generation.	Unlike	 these	previous	papers,	we	 study	
migrants	living	in	several	destination	countries	but	who	all	come	from	the	same	country	of	
origin.	 Although	we	 are	 not	 able	 to	 draw	 causal	 conclusions,	 our	 findings	 shed	 light	 on	
whether	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	migrants	with	different	attitudes	are	self‐selected	
to	different	destinations.		
	
The	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	Section	2	sketches	the	economic	theory	underlying	the	
analysis	and	derives	some	theoretical	predictions.	Section	3	 introduces	 the	data	sets	 that	
will	be	used	 in	 the	empirical	analysis.	 Section	4	 introduces	 the	variable	used	 to	measure	
preferences	for	redistribution	of	income	and	presents	the	distributions	of	the	variable	for	
different	groups	of	migrants,	and	section	5	does	the	same	for	the	measures	of	beliefs	about	
what	 determines	 individual	 success	 and	 generalized	 trust.	 The	 econometric	 analysis	 is	
reported	in	section	6,	and	section	7	concludes.	
	
	
2.2	Theoretical	Framework	
	
As	was	discussed	in	the	introduction,	individual	preferences	towards	income	redistribution	
are	 likely	 to	 reflect	 a	 variety	 of	 factors,	 ranging	 from	 self‐interest	 and	 altruistic	
considerations	towards	one’s	family	to	social	preferences	on	what	constitutes	a	just	society.	
We	take	the	type	of	income	transfers	in	each	country	as	given,	and	focus	on	the	preferences	
concerning	the	extent	of	income	redistribution,	captured	by	the	wage	tax	rate	 ,	 ∈ 0,1 	
in	country	n.	There	are	N,	 ∈ 2,3,4… 	countries.	Tax	revenue	 is	used	to	 finance	 income	
redistribution	towards	low‐income	people	in	the	country	where	the	tax	is	collected.	
	 	
We	denote	individual	i’s	wage	rate	in	period	t	by	 .	Note	that	the	individual’s	wage	rate	
does	not	have	a	country	index;	instead,	country	of	residence	is	a	characteristic	of	individual	
i.	This	allows	us	to	present	the	model	so	that	it	covers	both	the	case	in	which	individual	i	
lives	in	his	or	her	country	of	origin	(n=H	for	home),	as	well	as	a	case	in	which	individual	has	
migrated	and	has	preferences	towards	taxation	both	in	the	country	of	origin	(n=O)	and	in	
the	 country	 of	 residence	 (n=R).	 We	 use	 separate	 indices	 H	 and	 O	 to	 capture	 different	
incentives	facing	those	who	stay	in	their	country	of	origin	and	those	who	have	emigrated.	
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Vector	 	denotes	 the	 tax	 rates	 in	 different	 countries,	 including	H	 for	 those	who	have	not	
migrated	and	R	and	O	for	those	who	have	migrated.	
	 	
Taking	 into	 account	 government’s	 budget	 constraint	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 taxes	may	 distort	
labor	supply,	we	can	write	individual’s	expected	lifetime	utility	as	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
(2.1)	 	 ∑ , ∑ ∑ , .	 	
	
Here,	 	denotes	 the	 individual	 discount	 factor,	 	denotes	 the	 number	 of	 periods	 of	
remaining	 lifetime	 for	 individual	 i	 after	 the	current	period	0,	and	 , 	is	 the	periodic	
utility	from	own	consumption	and	leisure	that	depends	on	the	current	wage	rate	and	the	
wage	tax	rate	in	the	country	of	residence.	Therefore,	the	first	term	reflects	the	net	present	
value	of	individual’s	utility	from	own	consumption	and	leisure.	The	effects	of	increasing	the	
wage	tax	rate	are	positive	to	those	whose	net	gains	from	additional	income	redistribution	
exceed	distortions	associated	with	higher	wage	taxation.	The	welfare	effect	of	higher	taxes	
through	own	consumption	is	always	negative	to	net	payers	to	the	redistribution.	However,	
net	 recipients	 from	 income	 redistribution	 also	 have	 to	 balance	 gains	 from	 additional	
redistribution	against	additional	distortions	from	ever	higher	tax	rates.	This	means	that	the	
preferred	tax	rate	is	limited	for	everyone.	
	
The	 second	 term	 is	 related	 to	 altruistic	 considerations	 towards	 one’s	 family	 and	 close	
friends,	 with	 	denoting	 how	 many	 periods	 into	 the	 future	 individual’s	 altruistic	
considerations	towards	one’s	family	and	friends	extend.	In	case	of	no	migration,	family	and	
friends	live	in	one’s	home	country.	In	case	of	migration,	an	individual	may	have	family	and	
friends	both	in	the	country	of	origin	and	the	country	of	residence.	Individual	i	cares	about	
expected	 private	 utility	 of	 K,	 ∈ 0,1,2,… 	other	 persons,	 attaching	 utility	 weight	
, 0	to	 their	 utility	 from	 private	 consumption	 and	 leisure.	 K=0	 would	 refer	 to	 an	
individual	who	does	not	attach	a	positive	weight	to	any	other	individual	person.	
	 	
Finally,	 the	 last	 term	 refers	 to	 social	 preferences,	 related	 to	 one’s	 views	 about	 what	
constitutes	 a	 just	 society.	 Social	welfare	 function	discounts	 the	 future	 that	 the	 individual	
cares	about	with	respect	to	each	country;	this	allows	individuals	to	care	also	about	future	
beyond	 their	 lifetime,	 as	well	 as	 to	 have	 a	 different	 discount	 rate	with	 respect	 to	 social	
welfare	than	with	respect	to	their	own	utility.	
	 	
We	denote	the	expected	net	present	value	of	taxation	and	redistribution	to	individual	i	 in	
terms	 of	 private	 consumption	 by	 .	Note	 that	 only	 the	 tax	 rate	 of	 the	 country	 of	
residence	counts;	tax	rates	in	other	countries	have	no	effect	on	i’s	income.	A	positive	value	
implies	that	the	individual	is	net	beneficiary	from	redistribution,	a	negative	value	that	the	
sum	of	tax	payments	and	distortions	exceeds	the	value	of	benefits.	The	private	valuation	of	
the	effects	of	redistribution	on	family	and	close	friends	is	denoted	by	 .	We	assume	that	
B,	F	and	SWF	are	concave	and	single‐peaked	with	 respect	 to	each	 tax	 rate	 the	 individual	
cares	 about,	 and	 flat	 with	 respect	 to	 tax	 rates	 the	 individual	 does	 not	 care	 about.	 The	
expected	 total	 utility	 from	 redistribution	 is	 given	 by	 E .	The	
welfare	effect	of	an	increase	in	taxation	in	country	n	is	given	by	
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(2.2)	 .	 	 	 	 	
	
Our	 model	 allows	 preferences	 towards	 redistribution	 to	 enter	 the	 individual	 utility	
function	 both	 through	 pecuniary	 concerns	 and	 directly,	 along	 the	 lines	 discussed	 in	 the	
introduction.	 However,	 we	 also	 extend	 the	 model	 in	 Alesina	 and	 Giuliano	 (2011)	 by	
allowing	 individuals	 to	care	directly	about	 the	welfare	of	a	subgroup	of	other	 individuals	
close	to	them	(term	F),	 instead	of	caring	just	about	their	own	utility	(term	B),	and	that	of	
the	society	as	a	whole	(term	SWF).	
	
Individual’s	preferred	level	of	taxation	in	country	n	is	found	by	setting	the	right‐hand	side	
of	 (2.2)	 equal	 to	 zero	 and	 solving	 for	 ;	 the	 second‐order	 condition	 is	 satisfied	 by	 the	
concavity	of	B,	F	and	SWF.	In	case	of	no	migration,	individual’s	preferred	tax	rate	is	found	
by	setting	n=H	in	equation	(2.2)	and	setting	the	right‐hand	side	equal	to	zero.	As	taxes	are	
paid	and	transfers	received	only	in	the	country	of	residence,	for	migrants	 0	and		
	
(2.3)	 ;		 	 	 	 	 	
	
(2.4)	 .	 	 	 	 	
	
Equations	(2.3)	and	(2.4)	generate	a	number	of	testable	predictions.	
	
First,	the	preferred	tax	rate	in	one’s	country	of	residence,	whether	it	be	the	home	country	
in	 case	 of	 no	 migration	 or	 the	 destination	 country	 in	 case	 of	 migration,	 should	 be	
decreasing	 in	 one’s	 income	 and	 increasing	 in	 one’s	 age.	 The	 positive	 effect	 of	 age	 on	
support	for	redistribution	arises	as	many	of	the	benefits	that	the	welfare	state	provides	are	
received	 after	 retirement,	 while	 remaining	 working	 life	 during	 which	 costs	 are	 paid	 is	
shorter	for	older	individuals.	Furthermore,	net	payers	to	the	redistribution	who	think	that	
a	more	 redistributive	 society	would	be	more	 just	 attach	 a	 lower	weight	 on	 	relative	 to	
	as	 they	 become	 older,	 pushing	 towards	 higher	 preferred	 tax	 rate.	 We	 also	 expect	
women	 to	 support	 higher	 taxes	 in	 their	 country	 of	 residence,	 given	 that	 women	 earn	
typically	 less	 than	 men.	 If	 not	 controlling	 for	 income,	 we	 expect	 the	 support	 for	
redistribution	 to	 be	 lower	 among	 the	 high‐skilled,	 who	 are	 typically	 those	 with	 higher	
education.36	Relatedly,	 it	 can	 be	 expected	 that	 one’s	 support	 for	 redistribution	 in	 one’s	
country	of	residence	is	lower	in	case	one’s	partner’s	income	is	higher.	Such	an	effect	can	be	
expected	 to	be	 especially	 strong	 for	women,	 given	 that	men	 still	 usually	 earn	more	 than	
women.	In	case	of	migrants	in	the	survey	data,	this	effect	should	be	further	amplified	by	the	
fact	 that	 women	 are	 most	 often	 tied	 migrants.	 Based	 on	 this,	 we	 expect	 that	 having	 a	
partner	 should	 reduce	women’s	 support	 for	 redistribution,	while	 it	 is	 not	 clear	whether	
there	should	be	an	effect	for	men.	Although	Junge	et	al.	(2014)	find	that	the	likelihood	that	
																																																								
36	Education	can	serve	as	a	proxy	for	income	and	hence	as	a	measure	of	self‐interest.	However,	the	
relationship	between	education	and	preferences	for	redistribution	is	more	complex,	and	education	may	also	
make	people	more	positive	towards	redistribution.	See	Alesina	and	Giuliano	(2011).	
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a	 dual‐earner	 couple	 emigrates	 from	 Denmark	 is	 strongly	 responsive	 to	 the	 primary	
earner’s	income,	regardless	of	whether	the	primary	earner	is	male	or	female,	the	primary	
earner	is	in	most	cases	male.		
	
Second,	high‐income	individuals	should	prefer	a	higher	tax	rate	for	their	country	of	origin	
in	case	of	emigrating	than	in	case	of	staying.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	in	case	of	staying,	
they	would	have	to	pay	for	redistribution,	which	results	in	balancing	one’s	private	costs	of	
redistribution	with	potential	benefits	to	one’s	family	and	society	at	large.		
	
Third,	 having	 family	 members	 or	 relatives	 who	 benefit	 from	 income	 transfers	 can	 be	
expected	to	increase	one’s	support	for	redistribution	in	the	country	in	which	they	live.		
	
Fourth,	 we	 expect	 that	 those	 highlighting	 the	 role	 of	 own	 work	 and	 choices	 are	 more	
negative	 towards	 redistribution,	while	 those	viewing	also	 luck	 and	 family	background	 to	
play	an	important	role	are	more	positive.	This	should	hold	both	in	the	country	or	residence,	
as	well	 as	 in	 the	 case	of	migration	with	 respect	 to	 one’s	 country	of	 origin.	 Already	Fong	
(2001)	 provides	 support	 for	 such	 a	 view	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 migration.	 Furthermore,	 we	
expect	those	with	lower	trust	to	be	more	negative	towards	redistribution	as	they	are	likely	
to	be	more	worried	about	fraudulent	behavior	among	transfer	recipients.	
	
Fifth,	 in	 the	presence	of	multiple	destinations,	we	 expect	high‐income	earners	 and	 those	
who	are	more	negative	 towards	redistribution	 to	be	more	 likely	 to	be	 living	 in	countries	
with	 lower	 taxation	 and	 higher	 returns	 to	 skills.	 The	 idea	 of	 the	 high‐skilled	 choosing	
countries	with	 higher	 returns	 to	 skills	 is	 in	 line	with	Borjas	 (1987);	 Borjas	 et	 al.	 (2015)	
present	evidence	that	the	emigrants	from	Denmark	are	strongly	positively	self‐selected	not	
only	in	terms	of	their	earnings,	but	also	in	terms	of	residual	earnings.	As	that	paper	relies	
on	 register	data,	 it	 cannot	 shed	 light	on	 the	 role	 that	preferences	 towards	 redistribution	
may	play	in	the	self‐selection	of	emigrants.	Those	preferring	a	lower	level	of	redistribution	
than	 in	 their	 country	 of	 origin	may	 vote	with	 their	 feet,	migrating	 to	 less	 redistributive	
countries.	 This	 suggests	 that	 countries	 like	 the	 United	 States	 may	 succeed	 in	 attracting	
emigrants	with	especially	high	earnings,	while	relatively	egalitarian	countries	are	likely	to	
suffer	from	the	emigration	of	the	high‐income	earners.	
	
Sixth,	 those	planning	 to	 return	 to	 their	 country	of	 origin	 in	 the	 future	 should	have	more	
negative	views	towards	redistribution	there	in	case	they	expect	to	be	net	payers	towards	
redistribution	at	the	time	of	returning.		
	
Seventh,	among	migrants	who	do	not	plan	to	return	to	their	country	of	origin	and	do	not	
differ	with	respect	 to	 their	 concerns	 for	 family	and	 friends,	attitudes	 towards	 taxation	 in	
the	 country	of	origin	 should	depend	only	about	views	 towards	a	 just	 society,	 and	not	on	
their	 own	 income	 (any	 link	 between	 own	 income	 and	 attitudes	 towards	 redistribution	
should	reflect	a	correlation	between	income	and	those	views).	
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2.3	Data	
	
Statistics	Denmark	used	full	population	registers	from	1987	to	2007	to	identify	all	Danish	
citizens	who	had	emigrated	in	1987,	1988,	1992,	1993,	1997,	1998,	2001	or	2002	and	who	
were	 still	 abroad	 in	2007.37	Emigrants	had	 to	be	aged	18	or	more	when	 they	emigrated,	
and	 at	 most	 59	 in	 2007.	 They	 also	 had	 to	 have	 at	 least	 one	 parent	 who	 was	 born	 in	
Denmark.	 Statistics	 Denmark	 contacted	 first	 their	 parents	 or	 siblings	 to	 request	 their	
contact	 information	abroad.	Subsequently,	 they	were	asked	to	answer	a	web	scheme	in	a	
survey	that	took	place	in	June	2008.	The	overall	response	rate	among	stayers	who	could	be	
contacted	 was	 62	 percent.	 In	 the	 analysis	 of	 migrants	 we	 concentrate	 on	 Danes	 who	
migrated	to	destinations	outside	Greenland	and	the	Faroe	Islands.38	We	also	drop	survey	
respondents	who	 report	 having	 returned	 to	Denmark	when	 the	 survey	 took	 place.	With	
these	restrictions,	we	ended	up	with	a	sample	of	1979	male	and	2089	female	migrants.39	In	
the	 following	 analysis	 the	 number	 of	 observations	 changes	 slightly	 due	 to	 missing	
observations	in	different	survey	questions.	
Table	2.1	reports	the	number	of	respondents	who	stay	abroad,	according	to	the	destination	
country	group.	
	
The	 five	 most	 important	 residence	 countries	 for	 men	 are	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 United	
Kingdom,	Norway,	Sweden	and	Germany.	For	Danish	women,	the	order	is	slightly	different:	
the	United	Kingdom,	the	United	States,	Norway,	Germany,	and	Sweden.	Together,	these	five	
countries	 account	 for	 60	 percent	 of	 respondents.	 Of	 these	 five	 countries,	 Sweden	 and	
Norway	 are	 culturally,	 economically	 and	 politically	 closest	 to	 Denmark	 by	 far.	 The	
languages	are	closely	related	and	present‐day	Southern	Sweden	was	part	of	Denmark	for	
centuries.	All	 three	are	highly	redistributive	and	rich	welfare	states.	All	 in	all,	 this	means	
that	migrating	to	Sweden	or	Norway	is	very	easy	even	for	the	less	educated.	The	societies	
in	 the	 United	 States	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 place	 a	 much	 higher	
responsibility	on	individuals	themselves,	and	have	lower	taxes,	less	generous	transfers,	and	
wider	income	differences.	One	can	also	argue	that	work	is	more	central	in	the	Anglo‐Saxon	
countries.	
	
																																																								
37This effectively limits the analysis to migrants who have stayed abroad for at least five years. Having 
stayed abroad for five years predicts longer migration spells. For example, according to Danish population registers 
72% of men and 71% of women who left Denmark in 1996 and were still abroad after five years were also abroad 
after ten years. 
38 Greenland and the Faroe Islands are autonomous regions but still part of Denmark. We have excluded 
these destinations as many of these migrants could have originated in Greenland or the Faroe Islands, and many 
would actually be returning home rather than emigrating from Denmark.	
	 39	It should be noted that the observations are unweighted in the following analysis, and their 
distributions do not reflect the distributions in the underlying target population directly. However, as the target 
population can be identified in the Danish population registers, it can be confirmed that the distributions of the 
main individual sociodemographic characteristics from the year before emigration reflect those of the target 
population fairly well.	
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Based	 on	 these	 considerations,	 we	 classify	 destination	 countries	 into	 other	 Nordic	
countries,	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 or	 Ireland,	 Canada,	 Australia	 or	 New	
Zealand,	the	rest	of	Western	Europe	and	the	rest	of	the	world.	We	study	different	English‐
speaking	 countries	 in	most	 analyses	 separately,	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 whether	 the	 United	
States	stands	out	as	the	land	of	opportunities,	and	whether	migrants	to	the	United	Kingdom	
and	 Ireland	differ	 in	 their	attitudes	 from	migrants	 to	other	European	countries	 less	 than	
migrants	 to	 the	United	States,	Canada,	Australia	and	New	Zealand.	Most	 respondents	are	
living	in	English‐speaking	countries,	which	account	for	38	percent	of	men	and	40	percent	of	
women.	Other	Nordic	countries	accommodate	21	percent	of	both	men	and	women,	and	rest	
of	Europe	28	percent	of	men	and	33	percent	of	women.	Only	6	percent	of	women	and	13	
percent	of	men	live	in	the	rest	of	the	world.	
	
To	 compare	 emigrants	 with	 Danes	 living	 in	 Denmark,	 we	 use	 data	 from	 round	 4	 of	 the	
European	Social	Survey	(ESS),	conducted	in	2008/2009.	The	response	rate	for	the	survey	
in	Denmark	was	53.8%.	We	restrict	our	sample	to	those	who	were	at	least	24	or	at	most	60	
years	old	when	the	survey	 took	place,	 to	have	 the	same	age	group	as	respondents	 in	 the	
survey	to	emigrants.	With	this	restriction,	we	end	up	with	a	sample	of	939	ESS	respondents.	
	
2.4	Attitudes	towards	Income	Redistribution		
	
In	this	section,	we	show	how	attitudes	of	Danish	emigrants	compare	with	Danes	who	live	in	
Denmark	 in	 their	 attitudes	 towards	 income	 redistribution.	We	 also	 study	 how	 attitudes	
differ	between	migrants	 to	different	destinations.	Our	hypothesis	 is	 that	migrants	would,	
on	 average,	 self‐select	 themselves	 into	 different	 countries	 also	 according	 to	 their	
redistributive	 preferences.	 This	 would	 imply	 that	 those	 migrating	 to	 less	 redistributive	
countries	 would	 have	 more	 negative	 attitudes	 towards	 redistribution,	 even	 after	
controlling	for	education	and	socio‐economic	status.	
	
As	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 sections,	 preferences	 for	 redistribution	 are	 likely	 to	 reflect	
both	self‐interest	and	fairness	considerations.	In	order	to	focus	on	fairness	considerations,	
we	asked	in	our	survey	Danes	living	abroad	to	state	their	opinion	regarding	the	suggestion	
to	 increase	 income	 redistribution	 in	 Denmark.	 Another	 advantage	 from	 focusing	 on	
Denmark	 is	 that	 this	 guarantees	 a	 common	 point	 of	 reference	 to	 respondents	 living	 in	
various	countries,	and	allows	a	comparison	with	attitudes	of	Danes	 living	 in	Denmark.	 In	
the	 European	 Social	 Survey,	 attitudes	 towards	 income	 redistribution	were	measured	 by	
asking	respondents	to	state	whether	they	agree	strongly,	agree,	neither	agree	not	disagree,	
disagree	or	disagree	strongly	with	the	statement	“The	government	should	take	measures	to	
reduce	 differences	 in	 income	 levels.”	 Table	 2.2	 presents	 the	 distribution	 of	 answers	
separately	for	men	and	women.	
	
Table	 2.2	 shows	 that	 39	 percent	 of	 men	 and	 45	 percent	 of	 women	 are	 in	 favor	 of	
government	taking	measures	to	reduce	income	differences,	and	42	percent	of	men	and	34	
percent	of	women	are	against.	Therefore,	women	are	more	left‐wing,	in	line	with	findings	
by	Edlund	and	Pande	(2002),	although	differences	are	not	very	big.	
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In	 our	 survey	 for	 Danes	 living	 abroad,	 preferences	 for	 redistribution	 in	 Denmark	 were	
measured	with	 the	 following	question:	 “What	 is	your	opinion	of	 a	 suggestion	 to	 increase	
taxes	on	those	with	high	incomes	in	Denmark,	and	distribute	the	money	to	those	with	low	
incomes?”	We	used	a	5‐point	scale	from	“Strongly	in	favor”	to	“Strongly	against”.	Table	2.3a	
below	 reports	 the	 answers	 by	men	 and	 table	 2.3b	 answers	 by	women,	 according	 to	 the	
destination	country	group.		
	
Tables	 2.3a	 and	 2.3b	 reveal	 that	 there	 is	 a	 big	 gender	 difference	 in	 attitudes	 towards	
income	 redistribution.	 The	 majority	 of	 men	 oppose	 a	 suggestion	 to	 increase	 income	
redistribution	 in	 Denmark,	 whereas	 the	 majority	 of	 women	 support	 it.	 The	 majority	 of	
Danish	men	in	all	other	destinations	than	other	Nordic	countries	are	against	a	suggestion	to	
increase	redistribution	in	Denmark.	The	majority	of	women	in	all	destinations	are	in	favor	
of	increasing	redistribution	in	Denmark.	Among	both	men	and	women,	those	living	in	other	
Nordic	countries	are	most	positive	 towards	 increasing	redistribution	 in	Denmark.	This	 is	
not	 too	surprising:	one	would	expect	 those	who	are	most	 in	 favor	of	 redistribution	to	be	
more	likely	to	live	in	a	highly	redistributive	country.	
	
Both	men	and	women	living	abroad	are	more	polarized	in	their	opinions	than	Danes	living	
in	 Denmark.	 Although	 part	 of	 this	 may	 reflect	 subtle	 differences	 in	 the	 formulation	 of	
questions	 (our	 survey	 asked	 directly	 about	 redistributing	 income,	 ESS	 about	 “taking	
measures	 to	 reduce	 differences	 in	 income	 levels”),	 there	 is	 also	 a	 general	 pattern	 that	
women	living	abroad	are	more	positive	towards	increasing	redistribution	in	Denmark	than	
women	who	live	in	Denmark,	while	men	living	abroad	are	more	negative	than	men	living	in	
Denmark.		
	
	
2.5	Opinions	about	the	Determinants	of	Success	and	General	Trust	in	People	
	
Fong	(2001)	finds	that	individuals	prefer	more	redistribution	if	they	believe	that	poverty	is	
exogenously	determined,	and	Corneo	and	Grüner	(2002)	find	that	individuals	who	believe	
that	hard	work	is	important	for	getting	ahead	in	life	are	less	in	favor	of	redistribution.	Also	
trust	can	be	expected	to	affect	attitudes	towards	 income	redistribution.	Those	with	a	 low	
level	 of	 generalized	 trust	 are	 likely	 to	 view	 also	 welfare	 benefit	 claimants	 more	
suspiciously,	and	thus	have	a	more	negative	attitude	towards	redistribution.	To	account	for	
these	links,	our	survey	asked	for	opinions	about	the	determinants	of	individual	success	and	
also	an	attitude	question	measuring	generalized	trust.	This	allows	us	to	test	later	whether	
different	 attitudes	 towards	 redistribution	 in	 different	 destinations	 reflect	 different	
opinions	about	the	determinants	of	individual	success,	or	differences	in	generalized	trust.	
	
The	measure	 of	 beliefs	 on	 the	 determinants	 of	 success	 is	 based	 on	 the	 survey	 question:	
“Which	 of	 the	 following	 describes	 your	 standpoint	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 determinants	 of	
material	success?”	The	answer	alternatives	were	“Success	is	mainly	determined	by	own	work	
and	choices”,	“Success	is	about	equally	determined	by	own	work	and	choices	as	well	as	luck	or	
parental	 background”,	 “Success	 is	 mainly	 determined	 by	 luck”,	 and	 “Success	 is	 mainly	
determined	by	parental	background.”	As	the	last	two	categories	had	only	few	respondents,	
they	are	combined	in	the	subsequent	analysis.	
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The	measure	of	perceptions	on	general	trustworthiness	of	people	is	based	on	the	question:	
“Generally	speaking,	would	you	say	 that	most	people	can	be	 trusted	or	 that	you	need	 to	be	
very	 careful	 in	 dealing	with	 people?”	 The	 answer	 alternatives	 were	 “Most	 people	 can	 be	
trusted”,	“Don’t	know”,	and	“Need	to	be	very	careful”.	
	
Tables	2.4a	and	2.4b	 report	 findings	 concerning	opinions	on	what	determines	 individual	
success.	 The	 majority	 of	 Danes	 in	 all	 destinations	 replied	 that	 success	 depends	 about	
equally	on	own	work	and	choices,	as	well	as	luck	or	parental	background.	37	to	48	percent	
of	men	 and	 29	 to	 44	 percent	 of	women	were	 of	 the	 opinion	 that	 success	 is	 determined	
primarily	by	own	work	and	choices,	and	only	0‐2	percent	 that	 it	depends	mainly	on	 luck	
and	parental	background.	Overall,	men	highlighted	own	work	and	choices	somewhat	more	
than	women.	Those	who	migrated	to	the	United	States	highlighted	own	work	and	choices	
most,	followed	by	those	going	to	other	Anglo‐Saxon	countries	and	to	other	Nordic	countries.	
The	 emphasis	 on	 own	 work	 and	 choices	 in	 English‐speaking	 countries	 is	 in	 line	 with	
Alesina	 and	 Angeletos	 (2005)	 who	 studied	 differences	 between	 the	 United	 States	 and	
Europe,	finding	that	the	United	States	is	also	perceived	as	a	land	of	opportunities.	
	
Tables	2.5a	and	2.5b	report	generalized	trust	in	people.	Respondents	living	in	other	Nordic	
countries	seem	to	be	more	trustful	than	those	living	in	other	destinations.	
	
	
2.6	Explaining	Attitudes		
2.6.1 Preferences for redistribution 
	
The	 descriptive	 statistics	 in	 previous	 sections	 suggest	 that	 women	 are	 more	 positive	
towards	redistribution	 than	men,	and	 that	 those	who	migrated	 to	other	Nordic	 countries	
are	 more	 positive	 than	 others.	 We	 next	 study	 to	 what	 extent	 attitudes	 towards	
redistribution	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 residence	 country	 group,	 when	 controlling	 for	
characteristics	that	have	been	shown	earlier	to	affect	attitudes	towards	redistribution.	To	
do	 this	 we	 run	 ordered	 logit	 regression	 models40	controlling	 for	 gender,	 age,	 family	
situation	and	education.	Since	the	variable	to	be	explained	is	discrete	and	ordinal,	we	use	
an	ordered	logit	regression.	
	
As	 a	 point	 of	 comparison,	 we	 first	 report	 as	 table	 2.6	 ordered	 logit	 analysis	 on	 to	what	
extent	age,	family	situation	(measured	by	an	indicator	variable	for	being	married	or	having	
a	registered	partner,	and	an	indicator	for	having	children)	and	dummies	for	two	education	
categories	 (short	 or	 medium	 higher	 education	 and	 master’s	 degree	 or	 higher)	 explain	
attitudes	towards	income	equalization	among	Danes	living	in	Denmark.	Among	men,	only	
age	 has	 an	 effect	 that	 is	 statistically	 significant	 at	 the	 5‐percent	 level,	 with	 support	 for	
redistribution	increasing	in	age	(in	the	age	group	24	to	60).The	point	estimate	for	the	effect	
																																																								
40 Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used in all the regressions in the paper. We report 
regression coefficients in tables and refer to marginal effects in the discussion where appropriate. 
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of	 having	 a	 master’s	 degree	 or	 more	 is	 clearly	 negative,	 but	 does	 not	 reach	 statistical	
significance.	Among	women,	being	married	reduced	support	for	redistribution.	
	
Table	 2.7	 presents	 a	 corresponding	 analysis	 for	 Danish	 emigrants	 with	 the	 same	
explanatory	 variables.	 Among	men	who	 have	 emigrated,	 both	 short	 and	medium	 degree	
higher	education	and	master’s	degree	or	more	clearly	and	statistically	significantly	reduce	
support	 for	 redistribution.	 The	 broad	 gender	 differences	 are	 similar	 among	 Danes	 who	
have	stayed	in	Denmark	and	among	emigrants:	being	more	educated	reduces	support	for	
redistribution	among	men,	and	being	married	among	women.	
	
Table	 2.8	 introduces	migration	 related	 variables	 by	 including	 destination	 country	 group	
dummies	with	Nordic	Countries	as	the	omitted	category,	dummies	 family	related	and	work	
related	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 migration	 and	 additional	 controls	 for	 occupational	 category	
(medium	skilled	and	high	skilled)41.		
	
The	coefficients	for	controls	in	the	regression	for	men	are	in	line	with	earlier	results	known	
from	 the	 literature.	 The	 coefficient	 for	 the	 occupation	 category	 high	skilled	 is	 large	 and	
negative,	and	 those	with	higher	education	are	more	negative.	Further,	men	migrating	 for	
work‐related	 reasons	are	more	negative	 towards	 redistribution.	Male	migrants	 to	Anglo‐
Saxon	countries,	 the	rest	of	Western	Europe	and	the	rest	of	 the	world	are	more	negative	
towards	 increasing	 redistribution	 in	 Denmark	 than	 migrants	 to	 other	 Nordic	 countries.	
Surprisingly,	 the	 negative	 coefficients	 for	 other	 English‐speaking	 countries	 (Australia,	
Canada,	Ireland,	New	Zealand	and	the	United	Kingdom)	are	bigger	than	the	coefficient	for	
the	United	States.	If	migrants	self‐select	to	countries	that	offer	the	highest	after‐tax	income	
level,	 one	 would	 expect	 those	most	 negative	 toward	 redistribution	 to	 be	more	 likely	 to	
migrate	to	the	Unites	States.	Since	comparison	of	coefficient	sizes	can	be	misleading	due	to	
non‐linearity	of	the	ordered	logit	model	we	also	calculated	marginal	effects.	Residing	in	the	
United	States	makes	the	latent	support	for	redistribution	variable	0.06	standard	deviations	
smaller	 than	 residing	 in	 the	 Nordic	 countries,	 holding	 all	 other	 variables	 constant.	 For	
comparison,	 residing	 in	 the	 UK	 or	 Ireland	 makes	 the	 latent	 variable	 0.09	 standard	
deviations	 smaller.	 Work‐related	 reason	 for	 migrating	 makes	 the	 latent	 variable	 0.11	
standard	 deviations	 smaller	 holding	 all	 other	 variables	 constant.	 Having	 a	 high‐skilled	
occupation	 is	 the	 most	 significant	 determinant	 of	 preferences	 as	 having	 a	 high‐skilled	
occupation	 instead	 of	 a	 low‐skilled	 one	 makes	 the	 the	 latent	 variable	 0.17	 standard	
deviations	smaller	 in	comparison	 to	having	a	 low‐skilled	occupation.	The	main	 finding	 is	
that	the	men	migrating	for	work‐related	reasons	and	men	residing	in	destinations	outside	
Nordic	countries	are	more	negative	 towards	redistribution	of	 income,	but	 this	effects	are	
smaller	in	size	than	the	effects	of	own	occupation.		
	
In	the	regression	for	women	in	the	second	column	of	table	2.8,	age	of	the	respondent	has	a	
significant	positive	coefficient	as	was	the	case	in	the	regression	for	men.	Being	married	is	
associated	with	more	 negative	 attitudes	 towards	 redistribution.	 As	 in	 the	 regression	 for	
men	 the	 occupation	 category	 high	 skilled	 has	 a	 large	 and	 highly	 significant	 negative	
																																																								
  41 The category high skilled includes those who are self‐employed in a profession (e.g. doctor, dentist, 
lawyer), working in top management and high skilled workers (e.g. physicists, engineers, doctors and architects).	
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coefficient	 and	 being	 a	medium	 skilled	worker	 has	 a	 positive	 coefficient.	 In	 general,	 the	
estimated	 effects	 for	women	 are	much	weaker	 than	 in	 the	 corresponding	 regression	 for	
men.	 The	 dummies	 for	 the	 educational	 level	 have	 insignificant	 coefficients,	 and	 more	
importantly,	the	coefficients	for	destination	country	group	are	all	insignificant.		
	
A	possible	explanation	 for	 the	gender	differences	 in	destination	country	dummies	 is	 that	
many	 of	 the	women	 in	 the	 data	 are	 so	 called	 tied	migrants	who	 have	migrated	 because	
their	 spouse	 obtained	 a	 job	 abroad.	 A	 possible	 interpretation	 could	 then	 be	 that	 their	
occupation	does	not	reflect	their	education	as	well	as	with	men.	It	is	also	possible	that	their	
migration	decisions	are	not	related	to	their	attitudes	towards	redistribution	for	the	same	
reason.	If	this	is	the	case,	then	occupation	of	the	spouse	could	perform	better	in	predicting	
their	 attitudes	 than	 their	 individual	 characteristics.	 2.9	 extends	 the	 set	 of	 explanatory	
variables	 to	 include	 indicator	 variables	 for	 the	 occupation	 of	 the	 spouse.	 The	 estimated	
effects	 of	 spousal	 occupation	 for	 men’s	 attitude	 towards	 redistribution	 do	 not	 differ	
statistically	significantly	from	zero.	 In	the	regression	for	women	the	estimated	coefficient	
for	having	a	high	skilled	spouse	is	negative,	large	and	highly	significant,	and	the	coefficient	
for	medium	skilled	spouse	is	positive	and	significant.	The	estimated	effect	of	spousal	high‐
skilled	occupation	is	for	women	larger	than	the	effect	of	their	own	high‐skilled	occupation,	
which	 even	 loses	 its	 statistical	 significance	 among	 married	 women	 when	 spousal	
occupation	is	controlled	for.		
	
In	order	to	test	directly	the	effect	of	being	a	tied	migrant,	we	ran	regressions	separately	for	
women	who	migrated	for	work	reasons,	and	for	women	who	migrated	for	family	reasons.	
The	results,	that	are	reported	in	table	2.10	reveal	that	own	occupation	is	more	important	
for	women	who	migrated	for	work	reasons	and	spousal	occupation	for	those	who	migrated	
for	family	reasons.	It	should	be	noted	that	the	coefficients	for	spousal	occupations	include	
also	 the	general	effect	of	having	a	 spouse,	with	 reference	category	being	 those	without	a	
spouse.	
	
2.6.2  The effects of trust and opinions on the determinants of success 
	
As	beliefs	on	the	determinants	of	success	and	trust	on	people	can	be	related	to	preferences	
for	redistribution,	we	include	controls	for	these	attitudes	to	the	analysis.	This	allows	us	to	
test	 whether	 differences	 between	 different	 destinations	 are	 driven	 by	 such	 attitude	
differences,	or	persist	even	after	controlling	for	them.	For	example,	 it	could	be	that	those	
who	are	most	convinced	that	 individual	success	 is	determined	by	 individual	effort	would	
be	 most	 likely	 to	 migrate	 to	 the	 United	 States	 and	 other	 English‐speaking	 countries,	
resulting	in	more	negative	attitudes	towards	income	redistribution	there	even	if	attitudes	
towards	redistribution	would	not	be	directly	related	to	the	destination	choice.	
	
The	variables	measuring	these	beliefs	and	attitudes	are	based	on	the	corresponding	survey	
questions	that	were	discussed	in	section	2.5.	To	control	for	beliefs	on	the	determinants	of	
success	we	 include	a	dummy	variable	 for	 the	option	“Success	is	mainly	determined	by	own	
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work	and	choices”,	and	to	control	for	general	trust	on	people	we	include	a	dummy	variable	
for	the	option	“Need	to	be	very	careful”.	
	
Table	2.11	presents	the	regression	results.	Comparing	tables	2.8	and	2.11,	we	see	that	most	
of	the	coefficients	in	the	regressions	seem	to	be	robust	for	the	new	explanatory	variables.	
The	most	notable	change	is	that	the	destination	country	dummy	for	the	United	States	loses	
statistical	 significance	 in	 the	 regression	 for	men.	 	A	possible	 interpretation	 could	be	 that	
migrants	who	trust	in	own	work	and	effort	as	determinants	of	success	tend	to	self‐select	to	
the	United	States.	
	
In	 line	with	Fong	 (2001),	 both	men	and	women	are	more	 likely	 to	be	 against	 increasing	
redistribution	 if	 they	 are	 of	 the	 opinion	 that	 individual	 success	 depends	mainly	 on	 own	
work	 and	 choices.	 For	 men,	 looking	 at	 the	 marginal	 effects	 the	 effect	 is	 of	 the	 same	
magnitude	as	the	effect	of	migrating	for	work‐related	reasons.	For	women,	the	coefficient	is	
larger	than	the	coefficient	of	being	married	or	differences	between	different	destinations.	
Looking	 at	marginal	 effects	 for	women,	 the	 belief	 that	 own	work	 and	 choices	 determine	
success	 makes	 the	 latent	 preference	 variable	 0.13	 standard	 deviations	 smaller	 holding	
other	 variables	 constant,	 which	 makes	 the	 belief	 the	 most	 important	 determinant	 of	
preferences	for	redistribution	for	women.	Those	with	a	high	level	of	generalized	trust	are	
more	positive	towards	redistribution,	the	difference	being	somewhat	larger	for	women.	
	
	
2.6.3 The effect of altruism towards siblings in Denmark 
	
Since	the	respondents	are	themselves	living	abroad,	the	level	of	redistribution	in	Denmark	
does	not	affect	their	own	economic	situation	directly.		However,	the	respondents	could	care	
more	deeply	about	the	economic	situation	of	 their	relatives	than	about	non‐relatives.	We	
expect	persons	whose	close	ones	benefit	 from	 income	redistribution	 to	be	more	positive	
towards	it.	One	possible	explanation	for	this	is	evolutionary	biological.	Hamilton	(1964a,	b)	
argues	that	individuals	compare	benefits	of	their	actions	to	their	kin	with	the	private	cost,	
weighting	the	benefit	by	genetic	closeness.	To	test	this,	we	study	whether	those	who	have	a	
sibling	who	clearly	benefits	from	redistribution	prefer	more	redistribution	in	Denmark.	We	
searched	 respondents’	 siblings	 from	 the	 Danish	 population	 register,	 and	 ran	 regression	
using	an	 indicator	variable	benefit	 for	having	a	 sibling	who	resided	 in	Denmark	and	was	
unemployed	 or	 on	 early	 retirement	 in	 2007.	 Unemployment	 and	 retirement	 status	 are	
measured	at	 the	end	of	November	each	year,	 so	 the	 last	 calendar	year	before	 the	survey	
took	 place	was	 used.	 As	 reported	 in	 table	 2.12,	 the	 coefficient	 for	 the	 indicator	 variable	
benefit	 is	 statistically	 insignificant	 for	 men,	 but	 large	 and	 significant	 for	 women.	 The	
findings	 suggest	 that	women’s	 support	 for	 redistribution	 is	 to	a	greater	extent	driven	by	
the	 interest	of	their	kin	than	men’s	support.	Possible	 interpretation	could	be	that	women	
are	 in	general	more	altruistic	 than	men,	 even	 though	 it	 is	not	obvious	 from	evolutionary	
perspective	whether	kin	selection	should	be	viewed	as	altruism.	
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2.6.4 Selection or assimilation? 
	
Different	 attitudes	 towards	 redistribution	 among	 emigrants	 in	 different	 destination	
countries	may	result	from	migrant	selection	or	from	migrants	assimilating	and	adapting	to	
values	that	are	prevalent	in	their	new	home	country.	To	shed	light	on	the	issue	of	causality	
we	study	whether	age	at	migration	and	time	spent	in	the	destination	country	are	related	to	
preferences	for	redistribution.	
	
Alesina	and	Giuliano	(2011)	point	out,	 that	according	to	psychological	 literature,	political	
and	 economic	 beliefs	 are	 formed	 mostly	 during	 youth	 and	 early	 adulthood	 and	 are	
resistant	 to	 change	 afterwards.	 Krosnick	 and	 Alwin,	 (1989)	 have	 found	 evidence	 of	
significant	socialization	between	18	and	25	years	of	age.	If	assimilation	is	more	important	
than	selection,	and	if	younger	migrants	are	more	prone	to	assimilate,	we	would	expect	to	
find	 stronger	 association	 between	 preferences	 and	 destination	 countries	 for	 those	 who	
have	migrated	at	a	young	age.	A	 testable	 implication	of	 this	hypothesis	 is	 that	 those	who	
migrated	to	the	United	States	and	to	other	English‐speaking	countries	at	young	age	should	
have	more	negative	attitudes	towards	redistribution	than	those	who	migrated	at	an	older	
age.	 To	 see	 if	 this	 is	 the	 case	 we	 fit	 separate	 regression	 models	 for	 emigrant	 men	 in	
different	destination	country	groups	and	include	an	indicator	variable	for	young	migration	
age.		
	
Tables	 2.13a	 	 and	 2.13b	 present	 regression	 results	 for	 men	 and	 women	 who	 have	
emigrated	 to	 other	 Nordic	 countries,	 to	 United	 States,	 to	 UK	 or	 Ireland,	 or	 to	 Canada,	
Australia,	or	New	Zealand.		
	
Overall,	the	results	do	not	offer	support	for	the	hypothesis	that	younger	migrants	would	be	
assimilating	 to	 political	 values	 prevalent	 in	 the	 host	 country.	 The	 coefficients	 for	 age	 at	
migration	in	the	regression	for	the	United	States	are	statistically	insignificant	for	both	men	
and	 women,	 although	 the	 signs	 for	 the	 point	 estimates	 are	 negative	 as	 the	 hypothesis	
suggests.	Moreover,	the	coefficients	for	young	migration	age	are	positive	and	significant	for	
male	migrants	to	UK	or	Ireland.			
	
2.6.5 Plans to return to Denmark 
	
As	 was	 discussed	 in	 the	 theory	 section,	 among	 migrants	 who	 do	 not	 plan	 to	 return,	
attitudes	towards	taxation	in	the	country	of	origin	should	depend	only	on	views	towards	a	
just	society,	and	not	on	self‐interest	or	pecuniary	considerations.	And	the	other	way	around,	
among	those	who	plan	to	return	self‐interest	considerations	should	be	more	important.	We	
study	whether	this	is	the	case	by	running	separate	regressions	for	those	who	plan	to	return	
to	Denmark.	
	
In	 the	survey,	 the	respondents	were	asked	about	possible	plans	of	returning	 to	Denmark	
with	a	question	“Do	you	plan	to	go	back	to	Denmark	within	the	next	decade?”.	The	answer	
options	were	“no”,	“probably		no”,	“uncertain”,	“yes”,	“probably	yes”	and	“don’t	know”.	We	
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run	our	regression	model	separately	 for	those	who	chose	“yes”	or	“probably	yes”	and	for	
those	who	chose	other	options.	The	regression	results	for	men	are	reported	in	table	2.14a	
and	the	results	for	women	in	table	2.14b.	As	expected,	the	coefficients	for	age	and	having	a	
high	 skilled	 occupation	 are	 significant	 for	 both	 men	 and	 women	 who	 plan	 to	 return	 to	
Denmark,	but	insignificant	for	those	who	do	not	plan	to	return.	For	men,	the	coefficients	for	
the	destination	country	groups	are	 significant	 for	both	 those	who	are	planning	 to	 return	
and	those	who	don’t.	 	A	possible	 interpretation	 for	this	 finding	could	be	that	self‐interest	
considerations	 are	 indeed	more	 important	 in	 determining	 the	 preferences	 of	 those	who	
plan	to	return	to	Denmark.	
	
	
2.7	Conclusions	
	
In	 this	paper,	we	have	studied	 the	attitudes	 towards	 income	redistribution	among	Danes	
living	in	Denmark	and	Danish	emigrants.	Our	empirical	findings	are	in	line	with	the	earlier	
literature	and	with	our	theoretical	considerations.		
	
We	 found	 a	 remarkable	 gender	 difference	 among	 emigrants:	 the	 majority	 of	 men	 are	
against	 increasing	 redistribution,	 and	 the	 majority	 of	 women	 are	 in	 favor.	 Women	 are	
somewhat	more	positive	towards	redistribution	also	in	Denmark,	but	the	gender	difference	
is	much	smaller	than	among	emigrants.	Among	men,	support	for	redistribution	is	stronger	
among	those	who	migrate	to	other	Nordic	countries	and	weaker	among	those	who	migrate	
to	other	destinations	and	the	support	is	weaker	among	men	who	have	migrated	for	work‐
related	reasons.	However,	destination	country	group	or	purpose	of	migration	do	not	have	a	
significant	effect	 for	women.	A	priori,	 the	difference	between	destination	country	groups	
among	men	could	be	caused	by	self‐selection	of	migrants	according	to	their	preferences	for	
redistribution,	or	 it	could	be	that	migrants	assimilate	to	values	and	opinions	prevalent	 in	
their	countries	of	residence.	However,	we	do	not	find	evidence	of	assimilation	to	political	
values	prevalent	in	the	new	home	country.		
Women	who	had	 a	 sibling	who	 benefited	 from	 redistribution	 are	more	 positive	 towards	
redistribution	than	women	who	did	not	have	such	a	sibling,	but	a	similar	effect	is	not	found	
for	men.	Further,	we	find	evidence	that	pecuniary	self‐interest	factors	are	associated	with	
preferences	for	redistribution	in	Denmark	only	for	those	who	plan	to	return	to	the	country.	
	
We	 also	 examined	 individual	 opinions	 on	 the	 determinants	 of	 individual	 success.	 The	
majority	of	respondents	were	of	the	opinion	that	both	own	work	and	choices	as	well	as	luck	
and	family	background	play	an	important	role.	More	than	a	third	credited	success	to	own	
work	and	choices,	and	less	than	two	percent	primarily	to	luck	or	family	background.	As	one	
would	 expect,	 those	 who	 highlighted	 the	 role	 of	 individual	 choices	 and	 effort	 as	
determinants	of	individual	success	are	more	negative	towards	redistribution,	as	are	those	
who	 have	 a	 lower	 trust	 in	 people	 in	 general.	 Still,	 even	 after	 controlling	 for	 different	
attitudes,	 we	 find	 that	 Danes	 who	 migrate	 to	 other	 Nordic	 countries	 are	 more	 positive	
towards	 increasing	 income	 redistribution	 than	 Danish	 men	 who	 migrate	 to	 any	 other	
destination.	 Among	 women,	 the	 association	 between	 redistributive	 preferences	 and	
destination	 choice	 is	 much	 weaker.	 Instead,	 spousal	 occupation	 plays	 a	 big	 role,	 with	
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women	 whose	 spouse	 is	 high	 skilled	 being	 much	 more	 negative	 towards	 income	
redistribution.	
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Chapter 3. 
Trust towards Institutions among European Immigrants 
	
3.1	Introduction	
	
This	chapter	studies	individual	trust	towards	police	among	migrants	residing	in	European	
countries	using	data	from	the	European	Social	Survey.	It	is	well	established	in	the	literature	
that	 individual	 trust	 towards	other	people	 is	culturally	 transmitted	 from	the	countries	of	
origin	of	immigrants,	and	the	purpose	is	to	shed	light	on	whether	a	similar	pattern	can	be	
established	for	trust	towards	institutions.		
	
Empirical	 evidence	 also	 suggests	 that	 trust	 is	 associated	 with	 important	 economic	 and	
social	 outcomes.	 Trust	 has	 for	 instance	 been	 shown	 to	 correlate	with	 indicators	 of	 good	
government	(La	Porta	et	al.,	1997,	1999)	as	well	as	with	such	favorable	economic	outcomes	
as	 higher	 and	 more	 equal	 incomes	 and	 better	 institutions	 (Knack	 and	 Keefer,	 1997).	
However,	 the	causal	relationship	between	trust	and	 institutions	or	economic	outcomes	 is	
ambiguous.	 In	 recent	 studies	Tabellini	 (2008,	2010)	uses	 instrumental	variables	 to	 show	
that	 historical	 political	 institutions	 transmit	 trust,	 and	 that	 this	 inherited	 trust	 affects	
income.	 The	 link	 between	 trust	 and	 macro	 economy	 is	 established	 by	 Algan	 and	 Cahuc	
(2010),	who	use	 the	 trust	 levels	of	different	waves	of	 immigrants	 to	 the	United	States	 to	
estimate	how	changes	in	the	general	trust	level	have	affected	economic	growth.	The	paper	
also	provides	evidence	of	intergenerational	transmission	of	trust	by	showing	that	trust	of	
descendants	of	immigrants	is	related	to	the	trust	in	the	countries	of	origin.	
	
Also	other	papers	have	found	that	trust	 is	persistent	 in	time	and	 is	transmitted	from	one	
generation	 to	 the	 next.	 Dohmen	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 use	 data	 from	 the	German	 Socio‐Economic	
Panel	(SOEP)	to	study	intergenerational	transmission	of	trust	in	the	family.	Using	a	sample	
of	 parents	 and	 their	 grown	 up	 children,	 they	 find	 a	 strong	 positive	 correlation	 between	
trust	of	parents	and	their	children.	Evidence	of	intergenerational	transmission	of	trust	has	
also	been	found	in	a	number	of	other	papers	using	data	on	immigrants.	Guiso	et.	Al	(2006)	
find	 that	 trust	of	 immigrants	 in	 the	United	States	 is	 correlated	with	 region	or	 country	of	
ancestry	 fixed	 effects	 and	 Uslaner	 (2008)	 finds	 that	 trust	 in	 nine	 countries	 of	 origin	
explains	 a	 significant	 share	 of	 the	 trust	 of	 immigrants	 residing	 in	 the	 United	 States.		
Moschion	and	Tabasso	(2013)	study	descendants	of	immigrants	in	Australia	and	the	United	
States.	They	 find	 that	 trust	 in	 the	 country	of	 origin	of	 the	parent	 is	 a	determinant	of	 the	
trust	of	second	generation	immigrants,	but	that	the	social	and	economic	conditions	in	the	
country	of	residence	also	play	a	role.		Dinesen	(2013)	uses	data	on	immigrants	residing	in	
Western	European	countries	and	finds	that	both	the	trust	level	in	country	of	origin	and	the	
institutional	quality	in	the	country	of	residence	affect	the	generalized	trust	of	immigrants.		
	
Finally,	Ljunge	(2014)	studies	intergenerational	transmission	of	trust	using	data	from	the	
European	 Social	 Survey	 and	 World	 Values	 Survey.	 The	 paper	 studies	 children	 of	
immigrants	 in	 29	 European	 countries	 and	 estimates	 a	 strong	 intergenerational	
transmission	of	 trust	 from	the	country	of	origin	of	 the	mother,	whereas	 the	 transmission	
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from	the	father's	side	is	not	statistically	significant.	Individual	trust	level	of	the	migrant	is	
explained	 by	 regressing	 it	 on	 the	 trust	 level	 in	 the	 country	 of	 origin	 of	 the	 parent	 to	
establish	intergenerational	transmission	of	trust.	The	trust	level	in	the	country	of	origin	of	
the	parent	was	measured	as	the	share	of	people	in	the	country	answering	that	most	people	
can	be	trusted	in	a	corresponding	question	in	the	integrated	European	Values	Survey	and	
the	World	Values	Survey.	A	similar	survey	question	has	also	been	 included	 in	various	US	
surveys	such	as	 the	General	Social	Survey,	and	most	of	 the	earlier	 literature	doing	cross‐
country	comparisons	or	studying	migrants	has	based	the	measure	of	trust	on	it.42	However,	
the	 question	 concerns	 a	 special	 type	 of	 trust	 that	 can	 be	 called	 generalized	 trust.	 As	
Bjørnskov	(2006)	points	out,	it	is	not	clear	to	respondents,	what	kinds	of	people,	situations	
and	 circumstances	 the	 question	 refers	 to.	 Because	 of	 this	 ambiquity,	 the	 question	might	
pick	up	culturally	specific	perceptions	of	the	context	the	respondents	assume	it	to	refer	to.	
	
This	paper,	instead,	uses	survey	data	on	individuals	with	immigration	background	to	study	
a	more	particular	form	of	trust,	namely	turst	towards	police.	The	main	interest	is	on	trust	
in	 police	 among	 immigrants,	 but	 samples	 of	 native	 residents	 and	 descendants	 of	
immigrants	 are	 also	 analyzed	 to	 provide	 a	 point	 of	 comparison.	 Intergenerational	 and	
cultural	 transmission	 of	 generalized	 trust	 is	 already	 well	 established	 in	 the	 empirical	
literature,	 but	 less	 is	 known	 about	 the	 transmission	 of	 this	 type	 of	 particularized	 trust	
towards	a	specific	institution.	It	could	for	instance	be	the	case	that	a	more	particular	type	of	
trust	would	not	be	as	strongly	transmitted	from	the	origin	as	generalized	trust	is	according	
to	 results	 of	 Ljunge	 (2014).	 One	 reason	 for	 this	 could	 be,	 that	 immigrants	 gather	
information	 about	 the	 of	 the	 institutions	 and	 their	 trustworthiness	 in	 the	 country	 of	
residence	and	adjust	their	trust	towards	the	institutions	according	to	this	new	information.	
The	 transmission	 of	 trust	 towards	 a	 particular	 institution	 would	 then	 be	 more	 weakly	
transmitted	from	the	country	of	origin	and	between	generations	than	generalized	trust.		
	
Following	Ljunge	(2014),	the	paper	uses	a	method	of	regressing	individual	characteristics	
on	 country	 of	 origin	 values	 to	 study	 trust	 towards	 specific	 institutions.	 This	 so	 called	
epidemiological	approach	is	discussed	in	detail	by	Fernandez	(2010),	and	it	has	been	used	
in	studies	of	several	topics	including	women's	labor	supply	and	fertility	(see	e.g.,	Guinnane	
et	al.,	2006;	Alesina	and	Giuliano,	2010),	mobility	and	employment	of	youth	(Alesina	and	
Giuliano,	 2010),	 political	 participation	 (Alesina	 and	 Giuliano,	 2011)	 and	 preferences	 for	
redistribution	of	income	(Luttmer	and	Singhal,	2011).				
	
According	to	the	findings,	individual	trust	towards	police	is	associated	with	the	trust	levels	
in	 the	 countries	 of	 origin	 of	 European	 immigrants,	 but	 in	 a	 surprising	 way;	 individuals	
originating	from	countries	with	low	trust	 in	police	tend	to	be	more	trustful.	I	further	find	
that	 the	 result	 is	 driven	 by	migrants	who	 come	 from	 countries	 of	 origin	where	 average	
trust	 in	 police	 is	 lower	 than	 in	 the	 country	 of	 residence.	 Analyzing	 the	 sample	 of	 the	
children	of	 immigrants,	 I	don’t	 find	evidence	of	 intergenerational	transmission	of	trust	 in	
																																																								
42	As	was	mentioned,	the	answer	options	are	on	a	scale	fro	one	to	ten	in	the	European	Social	Survey.	
In	most	surveys,	however,	there	are	only	two	answer	option:	”Most	people	can	be	trusted”	and	“Can′t	be	too	
careful”.				
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police	in	the	country	of	origin	of	the	parent.	In	addition	to	trust	in	police,	also	generalized	
trust	 is	 analyzed.	 Even	 though	 Ljunge	 (2014)	 provides	 a	 thorough	 analysis	 of	 the	
transmission	 of	 generalized	 trust,	 similar	 regressions	 are	 presented	 to	 highlight	 the	
differences	 between	 results	 concerning	 generalized	 trust	 and	 trust	 towards	 a	 specific	
institution.			
	
The	 rest	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 Section	 2	 discusses	 the	 empirical	
specification,	 and	 the	 data	 is	 described	 in	 section	 3.	 Section	 4	 presents	 the	 econometric	
analysis	and	the	empirical	results	and	section	5	concludes.	
			
3.2	Empirical	specification		
			
As	 was	 noted	 earlier,	 the	 empirical	 specification	 follows	 closely	 the	 method	 used	 by	
Luttmer	 and	 Singhal	 (2011)	 and	Ljunge	 (2014).	 The	 analysis	 is	 based	 on	 a	model	 of	 the	
form	
	
(3.1)	 	 _ .	 	
	
The	 dependent	 variable	 	is	 the	 trust	 of	 individual	 ,	 residing	 in	 country	 	with	
origin	 in	country	 		 in	period	 .	The	variable	of	main	 interest	 is	 the	average	 level	of	 trust	
among	natives	in	the	country	of	origin	 _ .		Mean	trust	is	a	characteristics	of	the	
country	 of	 origin	 and	 is	 as	 such	 common	 to	 all	 individuals	 who	 were	 born	 in	 a	 given	
country	and	it	reflects	both	objective	characteristics	and	cultural	influences	of	the	country	
of	origin.	The	same	model	can	be	used	for	studying	both	first	generation	migrants	and	their	
descendants.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 first	 generation	 migrants	 country	 	refers	 to	 the	 country	 of	
birth	of	the	migrant,	whereas	in	the	case	of	descendants	of	migrants	it	refers	to	the	country	
of	 birth	 of	 the	 parent	who	 has	migrated	 from	 the	 country.	 captures	 such	 individual	
characteristics	as	age,	gender,	marital	 status,	 income	and	education	that	may	affect	 trust.	
Further,	the	residence	country	fixed	effect	 	captures	such	characteristics	of	the	residence	
country	as	the	quality	of	political	institutions	that	may	affect	individual	trust,	but	also	the	
effect	of	cultural	influences.	Due	to	the	country	fixed	effect	all	the	unobserved	differences	
that	 affect	 all	 residents	of	 a	 given	 country	are	 accounted	 for.	 	is	 a	 time	 fixed	effect	 and	
	is	 the	 error	 term.43	The	 estimation	 is	 done	 using	 ordinary	 least	 squares	 regression,	
and	 the	 standard	 errors	 allow	 for	 clustering	 over	 the	 country	of	 origin	 for	migrants	 and	
over	the	country	of	origin	of	a	parent	for	the	descendants	of	migrants.44	
	
3.3	Data	
	
The	data	set	that	is	used	consist	of	rounds	4,	5	and	6	of	the	European	Social	Survey	(ESS)	
that	were	collected	correspondingly	in	2008,	2010	and	2012	.	The	survey	includes	a	broad	
range	 of	 questions	 about	 sociodemographic	 characteristics	 of	 respondents,	 as	 well	 as	
questions	on	beliefs	and	attitudes.	The	survey	also	asks	about	 the	country	of	birth	of	 the	
																																																								
43	Country‐by‐year	fixed	effects	were	tried	as	well	but	this	did	not	alter	the	results.	
44	The	main	results	are	robust	to	using	ordered	logit	or	ordered	probit	estimator.	
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respondents	as	well	as	about	the	country	of	birth	of	both	parents,	which	allows	identifying	
migrants	 and	 their	 children,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 countries	 of	 origin.	 As	 such,	 the	 data	 allows	
studying	 individuals	 living	 in	 and	originating	 from	or	being	 children	of	 a	parent/parents	
originating	from	34	countries.		
	
The	main	focus	is	on	a	sample	of	immigrants,	that	consist	of	individuals	who	were	born	in	a	
survey	country	different	 from	the	country	of	residence.	For	comparison,	also	a	sample	of	
natives	and	a	sample	of	children	of	immigrants	are	analyzed.	The	sample	of	natives	consists	
of	respondents	who	were	born	in	the	country	of	residence,	and	the	sample	of	the	children	
of	 immigrants	 consists	 of	 respondents	who	 have	 at	 least	 one	 parent	who	was	 born	 in	 a	
different	 survey	 country.	 If	 both	 parents	 were	 migrants	 but	 were	 born	 in	 different	
countries	the	individual	was	dropped	from	the	sample.	The	migration	flows	of	immigrants	
in	 the	 data	 are	 described	 in	 Table	 3.1	 that	 shows	 the	 numbers	 of	migrants	 having	 been	
born	in	different	countries	of	origin,	as	well	as	the	biggest	destinations	for	each	origin.	
	
The	 variable	 of	 main	 interest,	 trust	 in	 police,	 is	 based	 on	 the	 European	 Social	 Survey	
question	about	trust	in	different	institutions,	where	police	is	one	of	the	institutions	that	is	
mentioned	 to	 the	 respondent.	 The	 question	 reads:	 ”Using	 this	 card,	 please	 tell	 me	 on	 a	
score	of	0‐10	how	much	you	personally	 trust	each	of	 the	 institutions	I	read	out.	0	means	
you	do	not	 trust	 an	 institution	 at	 all,	 and	10	means	 you	have	 complete	 trust.”	The	 same	
coding	 to	 the	 answer	 is	 used	 in	 the	 analysis,	 so	 that	 a	 higher	 value	 means	 that	 the	
respondent	expresses	a	stronger	agreement	with	the	statement.	Generalized	trust	in	others	
is	measured	with	 the	 question	 on	whether	most	 people	 can	be	 trusted	 that	was	 already	
used	by	Ljunge	(2014).		
	
The	explanatory	variable	of	main	interest	is	average	trust	in	police	in	the	country	of	origin	
in	 case	 of	 the	 sample	 of	 immigrants,	 and	 trust	 in	 police	 in	 the	 parent’s	 country	 of	 birth	
when	 the	 sample	 of	 children	 of	 immigrants	 is	 analyzed.	 The	 average	 trust	 is	 computed	
across	 the	 three	waves	 of	 the	 European	 Values	 Survey.	 The	 corresponding	measures	 of	
average	generalized	trust	are	computed	in	a	similar	manner.	
	
In	addition,	a	rich	set	of	control	variables	is	used	in	the	analysis.	Age,	gender,	presence	of	
children	at	home,	marital	status,	labor	market	status,	education	and	religious	affiliation	are	
observed	 in	 the	data.	 In	 the	regressions,	marital	 status	 is	captured	by	 indicator	variables	
for	 being	 divorced,	 widowed	 or	 having	 never	 been	 married,	 and	 education	 level	 by	
indicator	variables	 for	 tertiary	and	primary	education.	For	 labor	market	 status,	 indicator	
variables	for	having	been	unemployed	and	for	having	done	paid	work	the	week	before	the	
survey	 interview	are	 included,	and	 the	omitted	category	 is	having	been	outside	 the	 labor	
force.	 The	 income	 measure	 being	 used	 is	 based	 on	 income	 deciles	 in	 the	 country	 of	
residence.	The	indicator	variable	for	low	income	stands	for	the	bottom	three	deciles	in	the	
income	 distribution	 in	 the	 country	 of	 residence,	 whereas	 the	 indicator	 variable	 for	 high	
income	stands	for	the	top	three	deciles.		
	
3.4	Econometric	analysis	
	
Results	 from	 the	 regressions	 explaining	 generalized	 trust	 for	 the	 samples	 of	 natives,	
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immigrants	and	the	children	of	 immigrants	are	presented	 in	Table	3.2	For	the	 immigrant	
sample,	the	coefficient	for	the	average	trust	in	the	birth	country	is	positive	and	significant,	
as	is	the	coefficient	for	the	average	trust	in	the	country	of	birth	of	a	parent	in	the	sample	of	
children	of	descendants.	This	evidence	of	transmission	of	trust	is	in	line	with	the	findings	
by	Ljunge	(2014).	Coefficients	for	controls	are	relatively	similar	in	all	three	samples.			
	
Results	 from	 the	 regression	 explaining	 trust	 in	 police	 are	 reported	 in	 table	 3.3	
Concentrating	 first	 on	 the	 sample	 of	 natives,	 the	 comparison	 with	 the	 corresponding	
regression	explaining	generalized	 trust	 reveals	 some	 interesting	differences.	Women	and	
those	 with	 primary	 education	 tend	 to	 be	more	 trustful	 towards	 police	 and	 less	 trustful	
towards	other	people	in	general.	Similarly,	the	coefficient	for	being	widowed	is	negative	in	
the	regression	explaining	generalized	trust	but	positive	in	the	regression	explaining	trust	in	
police	and	living	in	a	big	city	is	associated	with	more	trust	towards	other	people	in	general	
and	with	less	trust	towards	police.		
	
For	the	sample	of	immigrants,	the	coefficient	for	the	average	trust	in	the	birth	country	has	a	
statistically	 significant	 negative	 coefficient	 meaning	 that	 immigrants	 originating	 from	
countries	where	 the	 average	 trust	 in	 police	 is	 low	 tend	 to	 be	more	 trustful.	 Further,	 no	
significant	 effect	 of	 the	 trust	 level	 in	 the	 country	 of	 birth	 of	 the	 parent	 is	 found	 for	 the	
children	of	 immigrants.	The	 latter	 result	 is	more	 intuitive,	 as	 the	 interpretation	 could	be	
that	 trust	 towards	 a	 particular	 institution	 would	 be	 based	 on	 information	 on	 the	 true	
trustworthiness	of	the	institution.		If	this	was	the	case,	then	individual	trust	in	police	could	
be	based	on	knowledge	of	 the	 trustworthiness	 of	 police	 in	 the	 country	of	 residence,	 and	
average	 trust	 in	 the	 country	 of	 birth	 of	 the	 parent	would	 not	 play	 a	 role	 in	 determining	
individual	trust.			
	
A	possible	interpretation	for	the	negative	coefficient	for	the	average	trust	in	the	country	of	
origin	 for	 the	 immigrants	 could	 be	 that	 migrants	 who	 come	 from	 countries	 where	 the	
average	trust	in	police	is	low	but	who	reside	in	countries	where	police	is	considered	to	be	
more	trustworthy	would	value	the	trustworthiness	relatively	high.	I	study	whether	this	is	
the	 case	 by	 splitting	 the	 sample	 of	 immigrants	 based	 on	 whether	 the	 individual	 has	
migrated	from	a	lower	trust	country	to	a	country	with	higher	average	trust	in	police	or	the	
other	way	around.	The	coefficients	for	average	trust	 in	police	 in	the	country	of	origin	are	
reported	in	table	3.4	The	coefficient	for	the	sample	of	immigrants	who	have	migrated	from	
a	lower	trust	country	to	a	higher	trust	country	is	indeed	statistically	significant	and	larger	
than	the	coefficient	that	was	estimated	from	the	pooled	sample,	whereas	the	coefficient	for	
the	migrants	from	higher	trust	countries	is	non‐significant.		
	
3.5	Conclusion	
	
In	 this	 paper,	 I	 have	 studied	 transmission	 of	 trust	 towards	 police	 across	 countries	 and	
generations	among	immigrants	and	their	children.	The	relationship	between	average	trust	
in	police	in	the	country	of	origin	and	individual	trust	in	police	among	immigrants	and	their	
children	 is	 strikingly	 different	 from	 the	 corresponding	 findings	 concerning	 generalized	
trust.	In	case	of	generalized	trust,	the	levels	of	trust	in	the	countries	of	origin	are	positively	
correlated	with	 individual	trust	 levels	of	 immigrants	and	the	effect	persists	to	the	second	
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generation.	 However,	 the	 average	 trust	 in	 police	 in	 the	 country	 of	 origin	 has	 a	 negative	
effect	on	individual	trust	among	immigrants,	and	no	effect	at	all	on	the	trust	 levels	of	the	
children	of	immigrants.	The	effect	on	the	trust	level	of	immigrants	is	driven	by	immigrants	
residing	 in	 countries	 where	 trust	 in	 police	 is	 higher	 than	 in	 the	 country	 of	 origin.	 One	
explanation	 for	 these	 findings	 could	 be,	 that	 generalized	 trust	 is	 a	 cultural	 trait	 that	
immigrants	bring	with	them	from	the	country	of	origin	and	that	it	is	as	such	also	inherited	
by	the	second	generation,	whereas	 trust	on	a	specific	 institution	might	be	determined	by	
knowledge	of	the	actual	trustworthiness	of	the	institution.		
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TABLES 
	
	
	
Table	1.1	Summary	Statistics		
	
	
 
Non-migrant 
men 
Migrant men 
Non-migrant 
women 
Migrant women 
Observations 6450665 7323 5163129 3436 
Age     
Average 39.8 33.0 40.2 35 
Median 40 35.4 40 33 
 
Annual 
earnings in 
2010 euros 
    
Average 52725 68151 40299 46412 
Median 46675 57350 37976 42393 
 
Standardized 
annual 
earnings  
    
Average 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.2 
Median 0.9 1.2 0.95 1.1 
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Table	1.2	Numbers	of	migrants,	by	destination		
	
 Men Women 
Sweden 1466 699 
The United States            763 363 
The United Kingdom  725 432 
Germany 560 249 
Norway 576 273 
Spain 255 147 
Switzerland 233  118 
France 222 156 
Other 2523 999 
	
	
	
	 	
68 
 
	
Table	1.3	Education	levels	of	non‐migrants	and	migrants	going	to	Nordic	countries	or	
to	other	destinations		
	
 Men Women 
 status Status 
Education 
Non-
migrants 
Nordic 
countries 
Other 
destinations 
Non-
migrants 
Nordic 
countries 
Other 
destinations 
Comprehensive 
school 
21.4 19.8 8.3 21.5 15.7 8.9 
High school 3.2 7.8 8.6 3.1 6.9 8.9 
Vocational 
school 
49.8 43.5 30.3 41.8 36.5 30.8 
Advanced 
vocational  
  
5.6 5.7 6.6 4.9 5.1 7.8 
Bachelor or 
equivalent 
12.2 11.6            20.6	 23.3 22.9 25.4 
Master’s or 
equivalent 
7.3 10.6 23.9 5.1 12.3 17.6 
Doctoral or 
equivalent 
0.5 1.0 1.7 0.2 0.7 0.7 
	
Notes:	The	category	“advanced	vocational”	includes	all	the	tertiary	education	programs	below	the	level	of	a	
Bachelor’s	program	or	equivalent.	Programs	on	this	level	may	be	referred	to	for	instance	with	such	terms	as	
community	college	education,	advanced	vocational	training	or	associate	degree.	
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Table	1.4	Summary	of	tests	of	stochastic	dominance	in	distributions	of	standardized	
pre‐migration	earnings		
	
Distributions being 
compared: 
Percent 
of sample 
below 
lower 
bound 
 Percent 
of 
sample 
above 
upper 
bound 
 
 Migrants Non-
migrants 
Migrants Non-
migrants
     
Migrants outside Nordic 
Zone and non-migrants 
    
Male 1.3 1.6 0.0 0.0 
     
     
Female 2.0 2.5 0.2 0.0 
     
     
Migrants to Nordic Zone 
and non-migrants 
    
Male 9.9 11.9 0.9 0.5 
     
     
Female 1.3 2.1 2.0 1.2 
     
     
	
Notes:	The	range	over	which	the	migrant	distribution	stochastically	dominates	at	a	95	
percent	confidence	interval.		
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Table	1.5	Mincerian	earnings	regressions,	by	gender			
 
 (1) men (2) women 
 b se B se 
Married 0.068***\ (0.00) -0.016*** (0.00) 
Children 0.025*** (0.00) -0.048*** (0.00) 
High school 0.224*** (0.00) 0.190*** (0.00) 
Vocational school  0.092*** (0.00) 0.089*** (0.00) 
Advanced vocational  0.186*** (0.00) 0.198*** (0.00) 
Bachelor   0.298*** (0.00) 0.225*** (0.00) 
Master’s  0.498*** (0.00) 0.536*** (0.00) 
PhD 0.490*** (0.00) 0.622*** (0.00) 
1996 0.020*** (0.00) 0.017*** (0.00) 
1997 0.043*** (0.00) 0.041*** (0.00) 
1998 0.078*** (0.00) 0.083*** (0.00) 
1999 0.103*** (0.00) 0.112*** (0.00) 
2000 0.141*** (0.00) 0.143*** (0.00) 
2001 0.175*** (0.00) 0.175*** (0.00) 
2002 0.207*** (0.00) 0.210*** (0.00) 
2oo3 0.236*** (0.00) 0.235*** (0.00) 
2004 0.252*** (0.00) 0.258*** (0.00) 
Constant 
Age fixed effects 
12.131*** 
Yes 
(0.00) 
 
11.931*** 
Yes 
(0.00) 
 
N 
R-squared 
6470720 
0.2597 
 
5173706 
0.3062 
 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
The table reports OLS results for the log annual earnings. 
Individually clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 
Coefficients for the age dummies are not shown.
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Table	1.6	Summary	of	tests	of	stochastic	dominance	in	distributions	of	residuals	
	
Distributions being 
compared: 
Percent 
of sample 
below 
lower 
bound 
 Percent 
of 
sample 
above 
upper 
bound 
 
 Migrants Non-
migrants 
Migrants Non-
migrants
     
Migrants outside Nordic 
Zone and non-migrants 
    
Male 5.6 6.2 0.0 0.0 
     
     
Female 12.4 14.0 0.3 0.0 
     
     
Migrants to Nordic Zone 
and non-migrants 
    
Male 12.0 13.4 1.1 0.7 
     
     
Female 8.8 0.9 1.6 11.1 
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Table	1.7	Logit	estimates	of	the	probability	of	emigration,	by	gender	
	
 (1) men (2) women 
 b se B se 
Married -0.110**   (0.04)  -0.191*** (0.05)  
Children -1.137*** (0.05)  -1.232*** (0.07)  
 Married*children 0.460*** (0.07)  0.374*** (0.09)  
 High school 1.377*** (0.05)  1.158*** (0.08)  
 Vocational school 0.186*** (0.04)  0.159** (0.06)  
 Advanced vocational 0.648*** (0.06)  0.714*** (0.08)  
Bachelor 1.097*** (0.04)  0.581***        (0.06) 
Master’s 1.652*** (0.04)  1.444***        (0.07) 
PhD 1.723*** (0.10)  1.655***        (0.21) 
y1996 -0.032  (0.06)  -0.001  (0.08)  
y1997 0.002  (0.06)  -0.016  (0.08)  
y1998 -0.024  (0.06)  -0.001  (0.08)  
y1999 0.230*** (0.05)  0.131  (0.08)  
y2000 0.260*** (0.06)  0.238** (0.09)  
y2001 0.161** (0.05)  0.146  (0.08)  
y2002 0.208*** (0.05) 0.046 (0.08) 
y2003 0.198*** (0.05) 0.112 (0.08) 
y2004 0.246*** (0.05) 0.178* (0.08) 
Constant -6.700*** (0.08)  -6.951*** (0.12)  
N 6470720   5173706  
Pseudo  0.0540  0.0557  
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
The table reports logit results for the long-term emigration. 
Individually clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 
Coefficients for the age fixed effects are not shown.
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Table	1.8	Actual	and	counterfactual	differences	between	the	average	log	
standardized	earnings	of	migrants	and	non‐migrants	
 Men Women 
Non-migrant average ‐0,065 ‐0,040
Estimated average for migrants 0,008 0,034 
True average for migrants 0,180 0,117
   
True difference 
0,245 0,157 
Counterfactual difference 
0,073 0,074 
Share of the actual difference explained 
by obervable characteristics, % 
29,6 
 
47,0 
 
	
 
Table	2.1	Number	of	respondents	by	destination	country	group		
	
 Men Women 
   
Other Nordic countries 409 445 
The United States                               338 285 
UK or Ireland  285 418 
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand 128 128 
Rest of Western Europe 561 700 
Rest of the world 258 113 
total 1979  2089 
Source: stayers survey 
 
 
 
Table	2.2	Attitudes	towards	increasing	redistribution	among	men	
and	women	living	in	Denmark		
	
 
Strongly 
against 
Somewhat 
against 
               
Neutral 
Somewhat 
in favor 
Strongly in 
favor 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % 
      
Men 10 32 19 28 11 
Women 4 30 21 32 13 
Source: European Social Survey 
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Table	2.3a	Men’s	attitudes	towards	increasing	redistribution	in	Denmark		
	
 
Strongly 
against 
Somewhat 
against 
               
Neutral 
Somewhat in 
favor 
Strongly in 
favor 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % 
      
Other Nordic countries 25 17 11 29 27 
The United States                          32 23 12 22 11 
UK or Ireland 40 19 10 19 12 
Canada, Australia, or New 
Zealand 
34 19 12 20 15 
Rest of Western Europe 38 22 8 23 9 
Rest of the world 40 26 6 15 12 
Source: stayers survey 
	
 
Table	2.3b	Women’s	attitudes	towards	increasing	redistribution	in	Denmark		
	
 
Strongly 
against 
Somewhat 
against 
               
Neutral 
Somewhat in 
favor 
Strongly in 
favor 
 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % 
      
Other Nordic countries 15 16 11 33 25 
The United States                          19 19 11 29 21 
UK or Ireland 15 17 13 32 23 
Canada, Australia, or New 
Zealand 
12 19 11 38 20 
Rest of Western Europe 15 20 13 33 19 
Rest of the world 16 24 10 29 22 
Source: stayers survey 
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Table	2.4a	Men’s	opinions	on	the	determinants	of	material	success	
	
 Own work and choices Both Luck or parental background 
 Row % Row % Row % 
    
Other Nordic countries 39 58 2 
The United States                               48 51 0 
UK or Ireland 41 59 0 
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand 47 53 0 
Rest of Western Europe 37 62 1 
Rest of the world 37 63 0 
Source: stayers survey 
	
 
Table	2.4b	Women’s	opinions	on	the	determinants	of	material	success	
	
 Own work and choices Both Luck or parental background 
 Row % Row % Row % 
    
Other Nordic countries 36 62 2 
The United States                               39 61 0 
UK or Ireland 37 63 0 
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand 44 56 0 
Rest of Western Europe 29 70 2 
Rest of the world 32 66 2 
Source: stayers survey 
	
	
	
Table	2.5a	General	trust	in	people	among	men	
 Need to be very careful Don’t know Most people can be trusted 
 Row % Row % Row % 
    
Other Nordic countries 11 3 86 
The United States                               17 6 78 
UK or Ireland 17 5 78 
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand 20 4 77 
Rest of Western Europe 17 5 78 
Rest of the world 23 3 74 
Source: stayers survey 
	
	
Table	2.5b	General	trust	in	people	among	women	
 Need to be very careful Don’t know Most people can be trusted 
 Row % Row % Row % 
    
Other Nordic countries 9 3 88 
The United States                               16 7 77 
UK or Ireland 14 5 81 
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand 17 5 78 
Rest of Western Europe 16 7 77 
Rest of the world 15 8 77 
Source: stayers survey 
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Table	2.6	Attitudes	of	men	and	women	living	in	Denmark	
 
 Men Women 
 b/se b/se 
   
Age 0.018* 0.020* 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Married 0.074 -0.535** 
 (0.20) (0.19) 
Children -0.124 0.108 
 (0.19) (0.20) 
Short or medium higher 
education 
0.078 -0.168 
(0.19) (0.18) 
Master’s degree or higher -0.398 0.068 
 (0.27) (0.27) 
N 
pseudo R-squared 
457 
0.0074 
480 
0.0089 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Source: European Social Survey 
	
	
Table	2.7	Attitudes	of	men	and	women	living	abroad	
 
 Men Women 
 b/se b/se 
   
Age 0.016* 0.027*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Married -0.059 -0.302** 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Children -0.026 -0.023 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Short or medium higher 
education 
-0.344*** 0.013 
(0.10) (0.10) 
Master’s degree or higher -0.414*** -0.144 
 (0.10) (0.11) 
N 
pseudo R-squared 
1891 1891 
0.0040 0.0045 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Source: stayers survey 
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Table	2.8	Explaining	attitudes		
 
 Men Women 
 b/se b/se 
   
Age 0.021** 0.032*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Married 0.052 -0.263** 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Children -0.070 -0.036 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Short or medium higher 
education 
-0.232* -0.006 
(0.11) (0.10) 
Master’s degree or higher -0.042 0.016 
 (0.11) (0.12) 
Medium skilled 0.233 0.212 
 (0.13) (0.12) 
High skilled -0.663*** -0.427*** 
 (0.10) (0.12) 
US -0.305* -0.214 
 (0.13) (0.15) 
UK or Ireland -0.499*** -0.019 
 (0.15) (0.13) 
CA, AU or NZ -0.584** 0.017 
 (0.20) (0.18) 
Rest of Europe -0.495*** -0.143 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
Rest of the World -0.488** -0.161 
 (0.15) (0.21) 
Work related -0.433*** -0.118 
 (0.10) (0.12) 
Partner or family related 0.216 -0.156 
 (0.12) (0.10) 
N 
pseudo R-squared 
1891 1891 
0.0324 0.0091 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Source: stayers surve 
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Table	2.9	Explaining	attitudes	with	the	skill	level	of	the	spouse	
 
 Men Women 
 b/se b/se 
   
Age 0.028** 0.033*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Children -0.163 -0.047 
 (0.12) (0.15) 
Short or medium higher  -0.190 -0.022 
education (0.13) (0.13) 
Master’s degree or higher 
0.042 0.185 
(0.13) (0.15) 
Medium skilled 0.438** 0.324* 
 (0.16) (0.15) 
High skilled -0.639*** -0.255 
 (0.12) (0.15) 
Spouse medium skilled 0.290* 0.304* 
 (0.14) (0.15) 
Spouse high skilled -0.095 -0.424*** 
 (0.13) (0.12) 
US -0.318* -0.154 
 (0.16) (0.18) 
UK or Ireland -0.428* -0.038 
 (0.18) (0.17) 
CA, AU or NZ -0.627** 0.200 
 (0.23) (0.23) 
Rest of Europe -0.522*** -0.013 
 (0.16) (0.14) 
Rest of the World -0.338 -0.035 
 (0.18) (0.24) 
Work related -0.464*** -0.064 
 (0.13) (0.16) 
Partner or family related 0.114 -0.065 
 (0.15) (0.12) 
N 
pseudo R-squared 
1268 1277 
0.0351 0.0146 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Source: stayers survey 
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Table	2.10	Women’s	attitudes	by	purpose	of	migration	
 
 Men Women 
 b/se b/se 
   
Age 0.052** 0.026* 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
Children 0.025 -0.096 
 (0.20) (0.18) 
Short or medium higher 
education 
-0.524* -0.013 
(0.24) (0.16) 
Master’s degree or higher 0.012 -0.074 
 (0.24) (0.18) 
Medium skilled 0.527* 0.135 
 (0.26) (0.17) 
High skilled -0.486* -0.371 
 (0.22) (0.20) 
Spouse*spouse low skilled -0.010 0.018 
 (0.22) (0.18) 
Spouse*spouse medium 
skilled 
-0.375 0.372 
(0.30) (0.21) 
Spouse*spouse high skilled -0.316 -0.476** 
 (0.25) (0.17) 
US -0.141 -0.368 
 (0.36) (0.22) 
UK or Ireland -0.509 -0.114 
 (0.31) (0.19) 
CA, AU or NZ -0.854* 0.207 
 (0.36) (0.24) 
Rest of Western Europe -0.384 -0.183 
 (0.23) (0.17) 
Rest of the world 0.148 -0.513 
 (0.37) (0.28) 
N 
pseudo R-squared 
436 899 
0.0275 0.0183 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Source: stayers survey 
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Table	2.11	Explaining	attitudes	with	opinion	variables	
 
 Men Women 
 b/se b/se 
   
Age 0.018* 0.030*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Married 0.041 -0.265** 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Children -0.057 -0.030 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Short or medium higher 
education 
-0.270* -0.081 
(0.11) (0.11) 
Master’s degree or higher -0.121 -0.117 
 (0.11) (0.12) 
Medium skilled 0.175 0.179 
 (0.13) (0.12) 
High skilled -0.658*** -0.413*** 
 (0.10) (0.12) 
Own work and choices -0.465*** -0.495*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
Low trust -0.240* -0.425*** 
 (0.11) (0.12) 
US -0.244 -0.198 
 (0.13) (0.15) 
UK or Ireland -0.496*** -0.019 
 (0.15) (0.13) 
CA, AU or NZ -0.536** 0.054 
 (0.20) (0.18) 
Rest of Europe -0.504*** -0.168 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
Rest of the World -0.488** -0.137 
 (0.15) (0.21) 
Work related -0.437*** -0.110 
 (0.10) (0.12) 
Partner or family related 0.187 -0.179 
 (0.12) (0.10) 
N 
pseudo R-squared 
1891 1891 
0.0384 0.0168 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Source: stayers survey 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
81 
 
 
Table	2.12	Explaining	attitudes	with	altruism	towards	a	sibling		
 
 Men Women 
 b/se b/se 
   
Age 0.021** 0.032*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Married 0.051 -0.260** 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Children -0.070 -0.035 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Short or medium higher 
education 
-0.232* 0.008 
(0.10) (0.10) 
Master’s degree or higher -0.043 0.031 
 (0.11) (0.12) 
Medium skilled 0.231 0.215 
 (0.13) (0.12) 
High skilled -0.662*** -0.431*** 
 (0.10) (0.12) 
US -0.304* -0.222 
 (0.13) (0.15) 
UK or Ireland -0.494*** -0.015 
 (0.15) (0.13) 
CA, AU or NZ -0.580** 0.028 
 (0.20) (0.18) 
Rest of Europe -0.493*** -0.143 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
Rest of the World -0.486** -0.166 
 (0.15) (0.21) 
Work related -0.433*** -0.115 
 (0.10) (0.12) 
Partner or family related 0.216 -0.152 
 (0.12) (0.10) 
Benefit 0.131 0.540* 
 (0.23) (0.24) 
N 
pseudo R-squared 
1891 1891 
0.0325 0.0100 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Source: stayers survey 
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Table	2.13a	Explaining	attitudes	with	age	at	migration	for	men	
 
 Nordic US UK  or IE 
CA, AU or 
NZ 
Other western 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
      
Age 0.019 0.038* 0.030 0.027 0.010 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Married -0.117 -0.027 0.297 -0.196 -0.074 
 (0.21) (0.26) (0.26) (0.48) (0.19) 
Children 0.244 -0.119 -0.124 0.078 -0.013 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.40) (0.19) 
Short or medium 
higher education 
-0.146 -0.545 -0.007 -0.514 -0.247 
(0.23) (0.29) (0.30) (0.44) (0.21) 
Master’s degree or 
higher 
0.417 -0.097 -0.326 -0.363 0.031 
(0.25) (0.30) (0.27) (0.45) (0.23) 
Medium skilled 0.001 0.285 0.657 1.039 0.066 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.38) (0.59) (0.23) 
High skilled -1.057*** -0.757** -0.770** 0.095 -0.605** 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.40) (0.20) 
Work related -0.681** 0.034 -0.600* 0.165 -0.473* 
 (0.25) (0.24) (0.30) (0.40) (0.19) 
Partner or family 
related 
0.043 0.895** 0.073 0.561 0.324 
(0.26) (0.28) (0.46) (0.42) (0.27) 
Young migration age -0.313 -0.136 0.663* 0.790 0.220 
 (0.28) (0.32) (0.31) (0.61) (0.26) 
N 
pseudo R-squared 
392 320 271 123 532 
0.0405 0.0398 0.0560 0.0241 0.0256 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
Source: stayers survey 
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Table	2.13b	Explaining	attitudes	with	age	at	migration	for	women	
 
 Nordic US UK  or IE 
CA, AU or 
NZ 
Other western 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
      
Age 0.079*** 0.034 0.010 0.012 0.027 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Married -0.418* -0.313 -0.459* -0.228 0.007 
 (0.20) (0.30) (0.19) (0.51) (0.19) 
Children 0.091 -0.442 -0.102 0.544 -0.062 
 (0.25) (0.27) (0.19) (0.46) (0.21) 
Short or medium 
higher education 
0.165 -0.022 0.016 -0.046 0.025 
(0.26) (0.28) (0.22) (0.40) (0.18) 
Master’s degree or 
higher 
0.210 -0.078 0.018 0.602 -0.044 
(0.29) (0.32) (0.26) (0.55) (0.21) 
Medium skilled 0.003 0.136 0.384 -0.621 0.460* 
 (0.24) (0.40) (0.26) (0.53) (0.22) 
High skilled -0.947*** 0.145 -0.513* -0.332 -0.247 
 (0.26) (0.33) (0.26) (0.49) (0.22) 
Work related 0.398 -0.069 -0.585* -1.018 -0.143 
 (0.26) (0.34) (0.29) (0.54) (0.21) 
Partner or family 
related 
0.114 -0.264 -0.258 0.157 -0.099 
(0.23) (0.26) (0.21) (0.46) (0.18) 
Young migration age 0.495 -0.060 0.347 -0.358 0.186 
 (0.27) (0.29) (0.22) (0.54) (0.17) 
N 
pseudo R-squared 
409 260 392 118 614 
0.0371 0.0108 0.0208 0.0345 0.0073 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
Source: stayers survey 
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Table	2.14a	Explaining	attitudes	according	to	whether	one	plans	to	return	to	DK	for	
men	 
 
 Plans to return No plans to return 
 b/se b/se 
   
Age 0.017* 0.036 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Married 0.135 -0.363 
 (0.11) (0.26) 
Children -0.008 -0.469 
 (0.11) (0.28) 
Short or medium higher 
education 
-0.242* -0.256 
(0.11) (0.30) 
Master’s degree or higher 0.025 -0.482 
 (0.12) (0.29) 
Medium skilled 0.218 0.176 
 (0.13) (0.49) 
High skilled -0.701*** -0.482 
 (0.11) (0.25) 
US -0.308* -0.394 
 (0.14) (0.40) 
UK or Ireland -0.408* -1.007* 
 (0.16) (0.40) 
CA, AU or NZ -0.461* -1.547* 
 (0.21) (0.65) 
Rest of Europe -0.447*** -0.904** 
 (0.13) (0.33) 
Rest of the World -0.450** -0.904* 
 (0.17) (0.42) 
Work related -0.382*** -0.673* 
 (0.11) (0.28) 
Partner or family related 0.255 -0.048 
 (0.13) (0.35) 
N 
pseudo R-squared 
1596 295 
0.0306 0.0592 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Source: stayers survey 
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Table	2.14b	Explaining	attitudes	according	to	whether	one	plans	to	return	to	DK	for	
women		
 
 Plans to return No plans to return 
 b/se b/se 
   
Age 0.034*** 0.022 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Married -0.217* -0.576* 
 (0.11) (0.24) 
Children -0.015 -0.215 
 (0.12) (0.25) 
Short or medium higher 
education 
-0.047 0.277 
(0.11) (0.27) 
Master’s degree or higher 0.063 -0.233 
 (0.13) (0.32) 
Medium skilled 0.206 0.231 
 (0.13) (0.32) 
High skilled -0.504*** 0.116 
 (0.13) (0.33) 
US -0.357* 0.746 
 (0.17) (0.40) 
UK or Ireland -0.117 0.543 
 (0.14) (0.36) 
CA, AU or NZ 0.059 -0.121 
 (0.21) (0.40) 
Rest of Europe -0.167 0.013 
 (0.12) (0.35) 
Rest of the World -0.383 0.625 
 (0.24) (0.46) 
Work related -0.129 -0.020 
 (0.13) (0.35) 
Partner or family related -0.165 -0.079 
 (0.11) (0.27) 
N 
pseudo R-squared 
1593 298 
0.0107 0.0233 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Source: stayers survey 
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Table	3.1	Immigration	flows	by	country	of	birth	
	
Country of origin 
Number of migrants 
from the country 
Biggest destination 
Number of migrants 
to the biggest 
destination 
    
Albania 212 Greece 185 
Belgia 65 Netherlands 17 
Bulgaria 133 Cyprus 32 
Switzerland 44 France 8 
Cyprus 12 Greece 6 
Czeck Republic 145 Slovakia 82 
Germany 622 Switzerland 219 
Denmark 61 Sweden 22 
Estonia 46 Finland 21 
Spain 105 Switzerland 26 
Finland 131 Sweden 106 
France 347 Switzerland 82 
United Kingdom 573 Ireland 369 
Greece 106 Cyprus 63 
Croatia 140 Slovenia 90 
Hungary 98 Israel 23 
Ireland 58 United Kingdom 44 
Israel 11 Switzerland 4 
Iceland 20 Denmark 8 
Italy 279 Switzerland 93 
Lithuania 109 Ireland 34 
Latvia 85 Ireland 22 
Netherlands 122 Belgium 58 
Norway 51 Sweden 32 
Poland 610 Ireland 190 
Portugal 152 Switzerland 56 
Romania 475 Israel 137 
Russia 1880 Estonia 660 
Sweden 129 Norway 52 
Slovenia 39 Croatia 24 
Slovakia 115 Czeck Republic 83 
Turkey 314 Germany 82 
Ukraine 564 Israel 221 
Kosovo 35 Switzerland 22 
Source: European Social Survey 
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Table	3.2	Explaining	generalized	trust		
	
 Natives Immigrants Descendants 
 b/se b/se b/se 
    
Trust, birth country  0.203***  
  (0.042)  
Trust, parent’s birth country   0.175*** 
   (0.052) 
Age -0.020*** 0.002 -0.047*** 
 (0.002) (0.015) (0.012) 
Age squared/100 0.019*** 0.000 0.051*** 
 (0.002) (0.015) (0.012) 
Female -0.040*** -0.016 0.084 
 (0.013) (0.044) (0.079) 
Children home -0.007 -0.171** 0.069 
 (0.015) (0.083) (0.080) 
Now divorced -0.147*** -0.206* -0.066 
 (0.023) (0.102) (0.130) 
Widowed -0.086*** 0.111 -0.100 
 (0.025) (0.179) (0.129) 
Never married 0.059*** -0.095 0.082 
 (0.021) (0.079) (0.118) 
Low income -0.262*** -0.222*** -0.223* 
 (0.018) (0.069) (0.113) 
High income 0.164*** 0.265*** 0.212*** 
 (0.019) (0.093) (0.067) 
Tertiary 0.490*** 0.462*** 0.510*** 
 (0.018) (0.101) (0.070) 
Primary -0.248*** -0.187** -0.437*** 
 (0.016) (0.071) (0.089) 
Paid work last week -0.017 0.096 -0.030 
 (0.017) (0.078) (0.089) 
Unemployed -0.267*** 0.002 -0.166 
 (0.028) (0.105) (0.164) 
Live in a big city 0.055*** -0.029 0.017 
 (0.014) (0.051) (0.082) 
Catholic 0.073*** -0.012 -0.113 
 (0.020) (0.054) (0.129) 
Protestant 0.232*** 0.078 0.148 
 (0.023) (0.099) (0.146) 
Orthodox 0.027 0.168** -0.124 
 (0.032) (0.068) (0.075) 
Islamic 0.053 -0.028 -0.307 
 (0.050) (0.195) (0.223) 
Constant 4.292*** 3.558*** 3.033** 
 (0.096) (0.541) (1.250) 
Residence country fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Indicator variables for ESS 
round 
Yes Yes Yes 
Indicator variables for missing 
data 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 
R-squared 
132663 7151 4279 
0.184 0.109 0.158 
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010   
Source: European Social Survey 
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Table	3.3	Explaining	trust	in	police		
 
 Natives Immigrants Descendants 
 b/se b/se b/se 
    
Trust, birth country  -0.291**  
  (0.125)  
Trust, parent’s birth country   -0.089 
   (0.165) 
Age -0.112*** -0.156*** -0.096** 
 (0.009) (0.050) (0.044) 
Age squared/100 0.129*** 0.171*** 0.127** 
 (0.010) (0.053) (0.049) 
Female 0.702*** 0.933*** 0.898** 
 (0.054) (0.208) (0.358) 
Children home 0.152** 0.082 0.172 
 (0.064) (0.340) (0.211) 
Now divorced -0.179* -0.307 0.370 
 (0.096) (0.374) (0.447) 
Widowed 0.399*** -0.723 0.723 
 (0.102) (0.627) (0.949) 
Never married 0.025 -0.579 0.271 
 (0.086) (0.368) (0.542) 
Low income 0.049 0.993** 0.011 
 (0.074) (0.394) (0.272) 
High income 0.147* 0.342 -0.131 
 (0.078) (0.270) (0.323) 
Tertiary 0.030 0.267 0.050 
 (0.073) (0.320) (0.407) 
Primary 0.473*** 0.919** 0.370 
 (0.067) (0.441) (0.366) 
Paid work last week -0.011 0.212 0.228 
 (0.069) (0.280) (0.356) 
Unemployed -0.379*** -0.460 -0.592 
 (0.116) (0.618) (0.408) 
Live in a big city -0.182*** 0.343 -0.284 
 (0.058) (0.270) (0.331) 
Catholic 0.135* 0.684 -0.058 
 (0.081) (0.540) (0.278) 
Protestant 0.238** 0.063 -0.275 
 (0.095) (0.514) (0.223) 
Orthodox 0.336** -0.786 1.971*** 
 (0.133) (0.835) (0.387) 
Islamic 3.048*** 1.022* 0.637* 
 (0.206) (0.580) (0.321) 
Constant 5.130*** 12.593*** 7.164*** 
 (0.399) (4.460) (1.477) 
Residence country fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Indicator variables for ESS 
round 
Yes Yes Yes 
Indicator variables for missing 
data 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 
R-squared 
132663 7151 4279 
0.015 0.018 0.029 
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010   
Source: European Social Survey 
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Table	3.4	Effects	of	the	average	trust	in	police	in	the	country	of 
origin	according	to	whether	migration	was	from	a	country	with	lower	
trust	
	
 
Higher trust in 
destination 
Lower trust in 
destination 
 b/se b/se 
   
Trust in police, birth country -0.528** -0.026 
 (0.232) (0.801) 
Individual controls  Yes Yes 
Residence country fixed 
effects Yes Yes 
Indicator variables for ESS 
round Yes Yes 
Indicator variables for missing 
data Yes Yes 
N 
 R-squared 
5086 2065 
0.022 0.029 
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010   
Source: European Social Survey 
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